From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
hch@infradead.org, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org,
kenny@panix.com, jeyu@kernel.org, rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk,
pbonzini@redhat.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com,
nadav.amit@gmail.com, thellstrom@vmware.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
rostedt@goodmis.org, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org,
David.Laight@aculab.com, dcovelli@vmware.com,
mhiramat@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2020 17:44:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200407154459.GA915708@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200407152412.GE20730@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 05:24:12PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 04:35:43PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 01:02:39PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX
> > > hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly
> > > inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it.
> > >
> > > Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan
> > > all out-of-tree modules' text and look for VMX instructions and refuse
> > > to load it when SLD is enabled (default) and the module isn't marked
> > > 'sld_safe'.
> > >
> > > Hypervisors, which have been modified and are known to work correctly,
> > > can add:
> > >
> > > MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y");
> > >
> > > to explicitly tell the module loader they're good.
> >
> > What's to keep any out-of-tree module from adding this same module info
> > "flag" and just lie about it? Isn't that what you are trying to catch
> > here, or is it a case of, "if you lie, your code will break" as well?
>
> If they lie they get to keep both pieces.
>
> The thing I worry about is them lying about "intree", is there anything
> that avoids that?
Yeah, the build system should be enforcing that. I haven't looked in a
while if that really is able to be "faked", but no distro would do that
so it shouldn't be an issue except for custom systems.
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-07 15:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-07 11:02 [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: Expose load_info to arch module loader code Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 2/4] module: Convert module_finalize() to load_info Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:53 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 14:35 ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 14:55 ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-07 15:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 15:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 15:44 ` Greg KH [this message]
2020-04-07 16:51 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 17:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 23:59 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08 7:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 18:26 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-07 18:26 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-07 21:25 ` David Laight
2020-04-07 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-08 2:10 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-08 8:09 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08 9:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-10 11:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:55 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 19:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:27 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 20:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:22 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 21:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 22:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 23:51 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 8:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 5:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07 23:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-08 0:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 8:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 9:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 21:48 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 5:58 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 8:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 8:58 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 9:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 10:45 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 8:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 8:59 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 9:25 ` David Laight
2020-04-08 11:13 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 11:17 ` David Laight
2020-04-08 9:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:50 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 13:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 15:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 15:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08 16:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-08 16:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-09 8:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-09 10:13 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-09 21:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-09 22:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-10 5:37 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 15:54 ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 19:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
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