From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: ksummit <ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] seccomp feature development
Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 13:52:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202005201340.ED17EDC@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200520202401.s22hstao4kzr5uma@wittgenstein>
On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 10:24:01PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 12:08:52PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 12:04 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > > Perhaps the question is "how deeply does seccomp need to inspect?"
> > > and maybe it does not get to see anything beyond just the "top level"
> > > struct (i.e. struct clone_args) and all pointers within THAT become
> > > opaque? That certainly simplifies the design.
> >
> > Exactly. I think that's the most common situation by far. Does anybody
> > really really need to care at a deep level, and why?
>
> We mostly don't and making all second-level pointers opaque is ok imho.
That'll make things MUCH easier. :)
> But I think that we need some documented consensus on all that stuff
> which I stressed in other mails before. I'll hand something in about
> this, if that's ok than we can hash this out.
Aleksa, I know you had an entire presentation[1] on the extensible
argument syscalls, but was there any text-based design doc that you made?
It would be really nice to update Documentation/process/adding-syscalls.rst
with the specifics[2], and to (now) include the "no nested flags"
requirement. What do you think?
-Kees
[1] https://github.com/cyphar/talks/tree/master/2020/01-linux-conf-au/syscall-extensions
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggD-eb3yPVs
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/adding-syscalls.html?highlight=syscall#designing-the-api-planning-for-extension
--
Kees Cook
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-20 20:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-20 16:17 [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] seccomp feature development Kees Cook
2020-05-20 16:31 ` Al Viro
2020-05-20 18:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-20 18:16 ` Al Viro
2020-05-20 18:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-20 19:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-20 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-05-20 20:24 ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-20 20:52 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-05-20 21:02 ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-22 4:06 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-05-22 7:35 ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-22 11:27 ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-20 22:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-05-20 22:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-05-20 23:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-20 23:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-21 0:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-05-21 0:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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