Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE

[Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>]

On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 06:23:26PM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote:
...
>  
>  /*
> - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
> - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
> - * path to the file in question.
> + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
> + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
> + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
>   */
>  static const char *
>  proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
>  			struct inode *inode,
>  		        struct delayed_call *done)
>  {
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +	if (!(capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);

You know, I'm still not sure if we need this capable() check at all since
we have proc_fd_access_allowed() called but anyway can we please make this
if() condition more explicit

	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE))
		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);

though I won't insist. And I'll reread the series a bit later once I've
some spare time to.