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From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: "David P. Reed" <dpreed@deepplum.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>,
	Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Martin Molnar <martin.molnar.programming@gmail.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix undefined operation VMXOFF during reboot and crash
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 14:36:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200610213604.GG18790@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200610181254.2142-1-dpreed@deepplum.com>

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 02:12:50PM -0400, David P. Reed wrote:
> If a panic/reboot occurs when CR4 has VMX enabled, a VMXOFF is
> done on all CPUS, to allow the INIT IPI to function, since
> INIT is suppressed when CPUs are in VMX root operation.
> However, VMXOFF causes an undefined operation fault if the CPU is not
> in VMX operation, that is, VMXON has not been executed, or VMXOFF
> has been executed, but VMX is enabled. This fix makes the reboot
> work more reliably by modifying the #UD handler to skip the VMXOFF
> if VMX is enabled on the CPU and the VMXOFF is executed as part
> of cpu_emergency_vmxoff().
> The logic in reboot.c is also corrected, since the point of forcing
> the processor out of VMX root operation is because when VMX root
> operation is enabled, the processor INIT signal is always masked.
> See Intel SDM section on differences between VMX Root operation and normal
> operation. Thus every CPU must be forced out of VMX operation.
> Since the CPU will hang rather than restart, a manual "reset" is the
> only way out of this state (or if there is a BMC, it can issue a RESET
> to the chip).
> 
> Signed-off-by: David P. Reed <dpreed@deepplum.com>
> ---
> @@ -47,17 +51,25 @@ static inline int cpu_vmx_enabled(void)
>  	return __read_cr4() & X86_CR4_VMXE;
>  }
>  
> -/** Disable VMX if it is enabled on the current CPU
> +/** Force disable VMX if it is enabled on the current CPU.
> + * Note that if CPU is not in VMX root operation this
> + * VMXOFF will fault an undefined operation fault.
> + * So the 'doing_emergency_vmxoff' percpu flag is set,
> + * the trap handler for just restarts execution after
> + * the VMXOFF instruction.
>   *
> - * You shouldn't call this if cpu_has_vmx() returns 0.
> + * You shouldn't call this directly if cpu_has_vmx() returns 0.
>   */
>  static inline void __cpu_emergency_vmxoff(void)
>  {
> -	if (cpu_vmx_enabled())
> +	if (cpu_vmx_enabled()) {
> +		this_cpu_write(doing_emergency_vmxoff, 1);
>  		cpu_vmxoff();
> +		this_cpu_write(doing_emergency_vmxoff, 0);
> +	}
>  }

...

> +/*
> + * Fix any unwanted undefined operation fault due to VMXOFF instruction that
> + * is needed to ensure that CPU is not in VMX root operation at time of
> + * a reboot/panic CPU reset. There is no safe and reliable way to know
> + * if a processor is in VMX root operation, other than to skip the
> + * VMXOFF. It is safe to just skip any VMXOFF that might generate this
> + * exception, when VMX operation is enabled in CR4. In the extremely
> + * rare case that a VMXOFF is erroneously executed while VMX is enabled,
> + * but VMXON has not been executed yet, the undefined opcode fault
> + * should not be missed by valid code, though it would be an error.
> + * To detect this, we could somehow restrict the instruction address
> + * to the specific use during reboot/panic.
> + */
> +static int fixup_emergency_vmxoff(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
> +{
> +	const static u8 insn_vmxoff[3] = { 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc4 };
> +	u8 ud[3];
> +
> +	if (trapnr != X86_TRAP_UD)
> +		return 0;
> +	if (!cpu_vmx_enabled())
> +		return 0;
> +	if (!this_cpu_read(doing_emergency_vmxoff))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	/* undefined instruction must be in kernel and be VMXOFF */
> +	if (regs->ip < TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +		return 0;
> +	if (probe_kernel_address((u8 *)regs->ip, ud))
> +		return 0;
> +	if (memcmp(ud, insn_vmxoff, sizeof(insn_vmxoff)))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	regs->ip += sizeof(insn_vmxoff);
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +
>  static nokprobe_inline int
>  do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, const char *str,
>  		  struct pt_regs *regs,	long error_code)
> @@ -193,9 +234,16 @@ static void do_error_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code, char *str,
>  	/*
>  	 * WARN*()s end up here; fix them up before we call the
>  	 * notifier chain.
> +	 * Also, VMXOFF causes unwanted fault during reboot
> +	 * if VMX is enabled, but not in VMX root operation. Fix
> +	 * before calling notifier chain.
>  	 */
> -	if (!user_mode(regs) && fixup_bug(regs, trapnr))
> -		return;
> +	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
> +		if (fixup_bug(regs, trapnr))
> +			return;
> +		if (fixup_emergency_vmxoff(regs, trapnr))
> +			return;
> +	}

Isn't this just a really kludgy way of doing fixup on vmxoff?  E.g. wouldn't
the below patch do the trick?

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h
index 9aad0e0876fb..54bc84d7028d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h
@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ static inline int cpu_has_vmx(void)

 /** Disable VMX on the current CPU
  *
- * vmxoff causes a undefined-opcode exception if vmxon was not run
- * on the CPU previously. Only call this function if you know VMX
- * is enabled.
+ * VMXOFF causes a #UD if the CPU is not post-VMXON, eat any #UDs to handle
+ * races with a hypervisor doing VMXOFF, e.g. if an NMI arrived between VMXOFF
+ * and clearing CR4.VMXE.
  */
 static inline void cpu_vmxoff(void)
 {
-       asm volatile ("vmxoff");
+       asm volatile("1: vmxoff\n\t"
+                    "2:\n\t"
+                    _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b));
        cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
 }



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-10 21:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-10 18:12 [PATCH] Fix undefined operation VMXOFF during reboot and crash David P. Reed
2020-06-10 18:58 ` kernel test robot
2020-06-10 19:36 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-06-10 21:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-06-10 21:42   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-10 22:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-06-10 21:36 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2020-06-10 21:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-11  0:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-11  0:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]       ` <1591893200.58634165@apps.rackspace.com>
2020-06-11 17:00         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-11 17:02           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-11 19:45             ` [PATCH v2] " David P. Reed
2020-06-11 19:48             ` David P. Reed
2020-06-25  6:06               ` Sean Christopherson

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