From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 17:56:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202006221748.DA27A7FFC@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200623000510.GA3542245@rani.riverdale.lan>
On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 08:05:10PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> But I still don't see anything _stopping_ the compiler from optimizing
> this better in the future. The "=m" is not a barrier: it just informs
> the compiler that the asm produces an output value in *ptr (and no other
> outputs). If nothing can consume that output, it doesn't stop the
> compiler from freeing the allocation immediately after the asm instead
> of at the end of the function.
Ah, yeah, I get what you mean.
> I'm talking about something like
> asm volatile("" : : "r" (ptr) : "memory");
> which tells the compiler that the asm may change memory arbitrarily.
Yeah, I will adjust it.
> Here, we don't use it really as a barrier, but to tell the compiler that
> the asm may have stashed the value of ptr somewhere in memory, so it's
> not free to reuse the space that it pointed to until the function
> returns (unless it can prove that nothing accesses memory, not just that
> nothing accesses ptr).
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-23 0:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-22 19:31 [PATCH v4 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:40 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-06-22 21:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-22 20:07 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-22 21:30 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-22 21:42 ` Jann Horn
2020-06-22 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-22 22:56 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-06-22 23:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-23 0:05 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-06-23 0:56 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-06-23 13:42 ` David Laight
2020-06-23 12:38 ` Alexander Popov
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] arm64: entry: " Kees Cook
2020-06-23 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
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