From: George Spelvin <lkml@SDF.ORG>
To: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, aksecurity@gmail.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, edumazet@google.com,
Jason@zx2c4.com, luto@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, peterz@infradead.org, tytso@mit.edu,
lkml.mplumb@gmail.com, stephen@networkplumber.org
Subject: Re: Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity"
Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2020 20:59:12 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200808205912.GE27941@SDF.ORG> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200808191827.GA19310@breakpoint.cc>
On Sat, Aug 08, 2020 at 09:18:27PM +0200, Florian Westphal wrote:
> Can't we keep prandom_u32 as-is...? Most of the usage, esp. in the
> packet schedulers, is fine.
>
> I'd much rather have a prandom_u32_hashed() or whatever for
> those cases where some bits might leak to the outside and then convert
> those prandom_u32 users over to the siphashed version.
That's a question I've been asking. Since this is apparently an
Important Security Bug that wants backported to -stable, I'm making
the minimally-invasive change, which is to change prandom_u32() for
all callers rather that decide which gets what.
But going forward, adding an additional security level between
the current prandom_u32() and get_random_u32() is possible.
I'm not sure it's a good idea, however. This entire hullalbaloo stems
from someone choosing the wrong PRNG. Adding another option doesn't
seem likely to prevent a repetition in future.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-08 20:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-08 15:26 Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity" George Spelvin
2020-08-08 17:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-08 18:08 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-08 18:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-08 19:03 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-08 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-08 21:29 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-08 17:44 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-08 18:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-08 18:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-08 20:47 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-08 20:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-08 22:27 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-09 2:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-11 16:01 ` Eric Dumazet
2020-08-08 19:18 ` Florian Westphal
2020-08-08 20:59 ` George Spelvin [this message]
2020-08-08 21:18 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-08 20:08 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-08 20:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-09 6:57 ` [DRAFT PATCH] random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable George Spelvin
2020-08-09 9:38 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-09 17:06 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-09 17:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-09 18:30 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-09 19:16 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-10 11:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-10 12:01 ` David Laight
2020-08-10 14:48 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-10 12:03 ` Florian Westphal
2020-08-10 14:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-10 16:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-10 16:58 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-10 17:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-10 18:01 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-10 21:04 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-11 5:26 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-11 5:37 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-11 3:47 ` George Spelvin
2020-08-11 3:58 ` Willy Tarreau
[not found] ` <fdbc7d7d-cba2-ef94-9bde-b3ccae0cfaac@gmail.com>
2020-08-09 21:10 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-09 21:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-09 13:50 ` Randy Dunlap
[not found] ` <CANEQ_++a4YcwQQ2XhuguTono9=RxbSRVsMw08zLWBWJ_wxG2AQ@mail.gmail.com>
2020-08-09 16:08 ` George Spelvin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-08-12 6:03 Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity" Sedat Dilek
2020-08-12 6:35 ` Sedat Dilek
2020-08-12 7:13 ` Sedat Dilek
2020-08-12 15:16 ` Eric Dumazet
2020-08-12 16:20 ` Sedat Dilek
2020-08-12 16:24 ` Eric Dumazet
2020-08-12 16:38 ` Sedat Dilek
2020-08-19 9:51 ` Sedat Dilek
2021-01-08 13:08 ` Sedat Dilek
2021-01-08 13:51 ` Sedat Dilek
2021-01-08 15:41 ` Eric Dumazet
2021-01-08 21:32 ` Sedat Dilek
[not found] <9f74230f-ba4d-2e19-5751-79dc2ab59877@gmail.com>
2020-08-05 0:57 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-05 1:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-05 2:49 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-05 15:34 ` tytso
2020-08-05 16:06 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-05 19:38 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-05 22:21 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-06 6:30 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-06 17:18 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-07 7:03 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-07 16:52 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-07 17:43 ` Willy Tarreau
[not found] ` <C74EC3BC-F892-416F-A95C-4ACFC96EEECE@amacapital.net>
2020-08-07 18:04 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-07 18:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-07 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-07 19:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-07 19:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-07 19:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-07 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-07 20:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-07 19:59 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-07 22:19 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-07 22:45 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-07 23:11 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-05 22:05 ` tytso
2020-08-05 23:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-06 17:00 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-05 16:24 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-08-05 16:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-08-05 15:44 ` Marc Plumb
2020-08-05 16:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-05 23:49 ` Stephen Hemminger
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200808205912.GE27941@SDF.ORG \
--to=lkml@sdf.org \
--cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
--cc=aksecurity@gmail.com \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=fw@strlen.de \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=lkml.mplumb@gmail.com \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=stephen@networkplumber.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
--cc=w@1wt.eu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.