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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Chang Seok Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: Disallow RDPID in paranoid entry if KVM is enabled
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 22:02:07 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200821200207.GW3982@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5120CF63-12EB-4701-B303-C0A96201F5A2@zytor.com>

On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 12:55:53PM -0700, hpa@zytor.com wrote:

> It is hardly going to be a performance difference for paranoid entry,
> which is hopefully rare enough that it falls into the noise.

Try perf some day ;-)

But yeah, given the utter trainwreck that NMIs are anyway, this is all
not going to matter much.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-21 20:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-21  2:50 [PATCH] x86/entry/64: Disallow RDPID in paranoid entry if KVM is enabled Sean Christopherson
2020-08-21  7:24 ` peterz
2020-08-21  7:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  7:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  8:09   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  8:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  9:05       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  9:22         ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  9:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  9:48             ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 10:07               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-22 16:42                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-16 16:54                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  9:28     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-08-21  9:37       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21 19:55       ` hpa
2020-08-21 20:02         ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2020-08-21  8:56 ` kernel test robot
2020-08-21  8:56   ` kernel test robot
2020-08-21 10:28 ` kernel test robot
2020-08-21 10:28   ` kernel test robot

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