From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net,
syzbot <syzbot+3ad9614a12f80994c32e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, wad@chromium.org,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Subject: Re: memory leak in do_seccomp
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 18:09:15 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200901000915.GA564594@cisco> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202008311620.AC4A7047D@keescook>
On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 04:25:35PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 30, 2020 at 08:50:15PM -0700, syzbot wrote:
> > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:
> >
> > HEAD commit: dcc5c6f0 Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-08-30' of git://git.ke..
> > git tree: upstream
> > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=10b297d5900000
> > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=903b9fecc3c6d231
> > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3ad9614a12f80994c32e
> > compiler: gcc (GCC) 10.1.0-syz 20200507
> > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14649561900000
> > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=118aacc1900000
> >
> > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > Reported-by: syzbot+3ad9614a12f80994c32e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> >
> > executing program
> > executing program
> > executing program
> > executing program
> > executing program
> > BUG: memory leak
> > unreferenced object 0xffff88811ba93600 (size 64):
> > comm "syz-executor680", pid 6503, jiffies 4294951104 (age 21.940s)
> > hex dump (first 32 bytes):
> > 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 36 a9 1b 81 88 ff ff .........6......
> > 08 36 a9 1b 81 88 ff ff 11 ce 98 89 3a d5 b4 8f .6..........:...
> > backtrace:
> > [<00000000896418b0>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:554 [inline]
> > [<00000000896418b0>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:666 [inline]
> > [<00000000896418b0>] init_listener kernel/seccomp.c:1473 [inline]
> > [<00000000896418b0>] seccomp_set_mode_filter kernel/seccomp.c:1546 [inline]
> > [<00000000896418b0>] do_seccomp+0x8ce/0xd40 kernel/seccomp.c:1649
> > [<000000002b04976c>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
> > [<00000000322b4126>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
>
> I haven't narrowed this down yet (and it *might* be a false positive),
> but it looks like this is filter->notif. The only way that's possible is
> if seccomp_notify_release() was never called *and* seccomp_filter_free()
> got called... which would imply a reference counting problem. The way
> there doesn't jump out at me yet, but I haven't yet decoded the C
> reproducer into the actual seccomp arguments, etc.
Looks like it's just a bunch of threads in the same thread group
trying to install a filter with TSYNC and NEW_LISTENER turned on. Does
the patch below look reasonable?
I didn't send it separately since I'm in the process of switching my
e-mail address to tycho@tycho.pizza; let this e-mail serve as proof
that that e-mail really is me too :). I can send it the normal way if
it looks good.
From d497e787e8e1b3e8b9230fdc4c9802616709c920 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 17:55:07 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: don't leak memory when filter install races
In seccomp_set_mode_filter() with TSYNC | NEW_LISTENER, we first initialize
the listener fd, then check to see if we can actually use it later in
seccomp_may_assign_mode(), which can fail if anyone else in our thread
group has installed a filter and caused some divergence. If we can't, we
partially clean up the newly allocated file: we put the fd, put the file,
but don't actually clean up the *memory* that was allocated at
filter->notif. Let's clean that up too.
Fixes: 51891498f2da ("seccomp: allow TSYNC and USER_NOTIF together")
Reported-by: syzbot+3ad9614a12f80994c32e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 3ee59ce0a323..21a76127833f 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1581,6 +1581,8 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
listener_f->private_data = NULL;
fput(listener_f);
put_unused_fd(listener);
+ kfree(filter->notif);
+ filter->notif = NULL;
} else {
fd_install(listener, listener_f);
ret = listener;
base-commit: b51594df17d0ce80b9f9f35394a1f42d7ac94472
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-01 0:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-11 17:06 memory leak in do_seccomp syzbot
2020-08-31 3:50 ` syzbot
2020-08-31 23:25 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-01 0:09 ` Tycho Andersen [this message]
2020-09-01 1:14 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-01 10:07 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-01 15:08 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-01 15:26 ` Tycho Andersen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-07-31 19:20 Sudip Mukherjee
2021-08-01 3:25 ` Kees Cook
2021-08-01 21:10 ` Sudip Mukherjee
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200901000915.GA564594@cisco \
--to=tycho@tycho.ws \
--cc=christian@brauner.io \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=syzbot+3ad9614a12f80994c32e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
--cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
--cc=tycho@tycho.pizza \
--cc=wad@chromium.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.