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From: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@digitalocean.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Aaron Lu <aaron.lwe@gmail.com>,
	Aubrey Li <aubrey.intel@gmail.com>,
	Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@oracle.com>,
	Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>,
	Nishanth Aravamudan <naravamudan@digitalocean.com>,
	mingo@kernel.org, pjt@google.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, fweisbec@gmail.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, kerrnel@google.com,
	Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>,
	Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>,
	Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	vineeth@bitbyteword.org, Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Agata Gruza <agata.gruza@intel.com>,
	Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com>,
	graf@amazon.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, dfaggioli@suse.com,
	rostedt@goodmis.org, derkling@google.com, benbjiang@tencent.com,
	Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@linux.intel.com>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 17/23] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide protection of kernel-mode
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 11:12:00 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200902151200.GA2474204@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87h7sgk41y.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>

Hi Thomas,

On Wed, Sep 02, 2020 at 09:53:29AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
[...]
> >> --- /dev/null
> >> +++ b/include/linux/pretend_ht_secure.h
> >> @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
> >> +#ifndef _LINUX_PRETEND_HT_SECURE_H
> >> +#define _LINUX_PRETEND_HT_SECURE_H
> >> +
> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_PRETEND_HT_SECURE
> >> +static inline void enter_from_user_ht_sucks(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&pretend_ht_secure_key))
> >> +		enter_from_user_pretend_ht_is_secure();
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static inline void exit_to_user_ht_sucks(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&pretend_ht_secure_key))
> >> +		exit_to_user_pretend_ht_is_secure();
> >
> > We already have similar config and static keys for the core-scheduling
> > feature itself. Can we just make it depend on that?
> 
> Of course. This was just for illustration. :)

Got it. :)

> > Or, are you saying users may want 'core scheduling' enabled but may want to
> > leave out the kernel protection?
> 
> Core scheduling per se without all the protection muck, i.e. a relaxed
> version which tries to gang schedule threads of a process on a core if
> feasible has advantages to some workloads.

Sure. So I will make it depending on the existing core-scheduling
config/static-key so the kernel protection is there when core scheduling is
enabled (so both userspace and with this patch the kernel is protected).

> 
> >> @@ -111,6 +113,12 @@ static __always_inline void exit_to_user
> >>  /* Workaround to allow gradual conversion of architecture code */
> >>  void __weak arch_do_signal(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
> >>  
> >> +static inline unsigned long exit_to_user_get_work(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	exit_to_user_ht_sucks();
> >
> > Ok, one issue with your patch is it does not take care of the waiting logic.
> > sched_core_unsafe_exit_wait() needs to be called *after* all of the
> > exit_to_user_mode_work is processed. This is because
> > sched_core_unsafe_exit_wait() also checks for any new exit-to-usermode-work
> > that popped up while it is spinning and breaks out of its spin-till-safe loop
> > early. This is key to solving the stop-machine issue. If the stopper needs to
> > run, then the need-resched flag will be set and we break out of the spin and
> > redo the whole exit_to_user_mode_loop() as it should.
> 
> And where is the problem?
> 
> syscall_entry()
>   ...
>     sys_foo()
>       ....
>       return 0;
> 
>   local_irq_disable();
>   exit_to_user_mode_prepare()
>     ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work()
>        {
>         if (ht_muck)
>           syscall_exit_ht_muck() {
>             ....
>             while (wait) {
>             	local_irq_enable();
>                 while (wait) cpu_relax();
>                 local_irq_disable();
>             }
>           }
>         return READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
>        }
> 
>     if (unlikely(ti_work & WORK))
>     	ti_work = exit_loop(ti_work)
> 
>         while (ti_work & MASK) {
>           local_irq_enable();
>           .....
>           local_irq_disable();
>           ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work()
>             {
>               See above
>             }
>        }
> 
> It covers both the 'no work' and the 'do work' exit path. If that's not
> sufficient, then something is fundamentally wrong with your design.

Yes, you are right, I got confused from your previous patch. This works too
and is exactly as my design. I will do it this way then. Thank you, Thomas!

 - Joel


  reply	other threads:[~2020-09-02 15:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-28 19:51 [RFC PATCH v7 00/23] Core scheduling v7 Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/23] sched: Wrap rq::lock access Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/23] sched: Introduce sched_class::pick_task() Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/23] sched: Core-wide rq->lock Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/23] sched/fair: Add a few assertions Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/23] sched: Basic tracking of matching tasks Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/23] bitops: Introduce find_next_or_bit Julien Desfossez
2020-09-03  5:13   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/23] cpumask: Introduce a new iterator for_each_cpu_wrap_or Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/23] sched: Add core wide task selection and scheduling Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 20:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-08-28 22:02     ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-08-28 22:23       ` Joel Fernandes
2020-08-29  7:47       ` peterz
2020-08-31 13:01         ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-08-31 14:24         ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-01  3:38         ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-01  5:10         ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-01 12:34           ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-09-01 17:30             ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-01 21:23               ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-09-02  1:11                 ` Joel Fernandes
2020-08-28 20:55   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-08-28 22:15     ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-09-15 20:08   ` Joel Fernandes
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/23] sched/fair: Fix forced idle sibling starvation corner case Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 21:25   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-08-28 23:24     ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/23] sched/fair: wrapper for cfs_rq->min_vruntime Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/23] sched/fair: core wide cfs task priority comparison Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 21:29   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-17 14:15     ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-09-17 20:39       ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-09-23  1:46     ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-23  1:52       ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-25 15:02         ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-15 21:49   ` chris hyser
     [not found]     ` <81b208ad-b9e6-bfbf-631e-02e9f75d73a2@linux.intel.com>
2020-09-16 14:24       ` chris hyser
2020-09-16 20:53         ` chris hyser
2020-09-17  1:09           ` Li, Aubrey
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/23] sched: Trivial forced-newidle balancer Julien Desfossez
2020-09-02  7:08   ` Pavan Kondeti
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/23] sched: migration changes for core scheduling Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/23] irq_work: Add support to detect if work is pending Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/23] entry/idle: Add a common function for activites during idle entry/exit Julien Desfossez
2020-08-30  2:17   ` kernel test robot
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/23] arch/x86: Add a new TIF flag for untrusted tasks Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/23] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide protection of kernel-mode Julien Desfossez
2020-08-30  6:50   ` [kernel/entry] 872a0a3f0b: will-it-scale.per_thread_ops -18.7% regression kernel test robot
2020-09-01 15:54   ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/23] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide protection of kernel-mode Thomas Gleixner
2020-09-01 16:50     ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-01 20:02       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-09-02  1:29         ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-02  7:53           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-09-02 15:12             ` Joel Fernandes [this message]
2020-09-02 16:57             ` Dario Faggioli
2020-09-03  4:34               ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-03 11:05                 ` Vineeth Pillai
2020-09-03 13:20                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-09-03 20:30                   ` Joel Fernandes
2020-09-03 13:43                 ` Dario Faggioli
2020-09-03 20:25                   ` Joel Fernandes
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 18/23] entry/idle: Enter and exit kernel protection during idle entry and exit Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 19/23] entry/kvm: Protect the kernel when entering from guest Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 20/23] sched/coresched: config option for kernel protection Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 21/23] sched: cgroup tagging interface for core scheduling Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 22/23] Documentation: Add documentation on " Julien Desfossez
2020-08-28 19:51 ` [RFC PATCH v7 23/23] sched: Debug bits Julien Desfossez

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