Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path

[Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>]

Hi Arvind,

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 01:00:08PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 05:11:19PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > +
> > +	/* Store value to memory and keep it in %r10 */
> > +	movq	%r10, sev_check_data(%rip)
> > +
> 
> Does there need to be a cache flush/invalidation between this and the
> read below to avoid just reading back from cache, or will the hardware
> take care of that?

No, a cache flush is not needed. When the C bit position is correct,
then the data will be mapped encrypted with the old and the new
page-table. If the C bit position is wrong, the access goes to a
different physical address.

> > +	/* Backup current %cr3 value to restore it later */
> > +	movq	%cr3, %r11
> > +
> > +	/* Switch to new %cr3 - This might unmap the stack */
> > +	movq	%rdi, %cr3
> 
> Does there need to be a TLB flush after this? When executed from the
> main kernel's head code, CR4.PGE is enabled, and if the original page
> mapping had the global bit set (the decompressor stub sets that in the
> identity mapping), won't the read below still use the original encrypted
> mapping if we don't explicitly flush it?

The check only really matters for the boot CPU, not for the secondary
CPUs. IIRC at this point in boot CR4.PGE is still off.

Regards,

	Joerg