Re: [PATCH RFC UEK5 2/7] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode

[Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>]

On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 04:59:59PM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
> private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
> has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
> 
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> 
> [Backport notes:
>  The upstream version is using enums, and all that fancy code.
>  We are just retroffiting UEK5 a bit and just checking to
>  see if integrity mode has been enabled and if so then
>  allow it. If the default lockdown mode (confidentiality) is on
>  then we don't allow it.]

<sigh>

And that is what I get for _not_ doing --suppress-cc=all

My apologies for spamming you all!

<goes to hide in the corner of shame>