From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.19] fscrypt: return -EXDEV for incompatible rename or link into encrypted dir
Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2020 11:30:18 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201101103018.GA2558892@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201031183551.202400-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 11:35:51AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>
> commit f5e55e777cc93eae1416f0fa4908e8846b6d7825 upstream.
> [Please apply to 4.19-stable. This is an important fix to have,
> and it will be needed for xfstest generic/398 to pass if
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201031054141.695517-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
> is applied. This is a clean cherry-pick to 4.19, but it doesn't apply
> to 4.14 and earlier; different backports would be needed for that.]
>
> Currently, trying to rename or link a regular file, directory, or
> symlink into an encrypted directory fails with EPERM when the source
> file is unencrypted or is encrypted with a different encryption policy,
> and is on the same mountpoint. It is correct for the operation to fail,
> but the choice of EPERM breaks tools like 'mv' that know to copy rather
> than rename if they see EXDEV, but don't know what to do with EPERM.
>
> Our original motivation for EPERM was to encourage users to securely
> handle their data. Encrypting files by "moving" them into an encrypted
> directory can be insecure because the unencrypted data may remain in
> free space on disk, where it can later be recovered by an attacker.
> It's much better to encrypt the data from the start, or at least try to
> securely delete the source data e.g. using the 'shred' program.
>
> However, the current behavior hasn't been effective at achieving its
> goal because users tend to be confused, hack around it, and complain;
> see e.g. https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/76. And in some cases
> it's actually inconsistent or unnecessary. For example, 'mv'-ing files
> between differently encrypted directories doesn't work even in cases
> where it can be secure, such as when in userspace the same passphrase
> protects both directories. Yet, you *can* already 'mv' unencrypted
> files into an encrypted directory if the source files are on a different
> mountpoint, even though doing so is often insecure.
>
> There are probably better ways to teach users to securely handle their
> files. For example, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool could provide a
> command that migrates unencrypted files into an encrypted directory,
> acting like 'shred' on the source files and providing appropriate
> warnings depending on the type of the source filesystem and disk.
>
> Receiving errors on unimportant files might also force some users to
> disable encryption, thus making the behavior counterproductive. It's
> desirable to make encryption as unobtrusive as possible.
>
> Therefore, change the error code from EPERM to EXDEV so that tools
> looking for EXDEV will fall back to a copy.
>
> This, of course, doesn't prevent users from still doing the right things
> to securely manage their files. Note that this also matches the
> behavior when a file is renamed between two project quota hierarchies;
> so there's precedent for using EXDEV for things other than mountpoints.
>
> xfstests generic/398 will require an update with this change.
>
> [Rewritten from an earlier patch series by Michael Halcrow.]
>
> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
> Cc: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> ---
> Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 12 ++++++++++--
> fs/crypto/hooks.c | 6 +++---
> fs/crypto/policy.c | 3 +--
> include/linux/fscrypt.h | 4 ++--
> 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
All 4 backports now queued up, thanks!
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-01 10:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-31 18:35 [PATCH 4.19] fscrypt: return -EXDEV for incompatible rename or link into encrypted dir Eric Biggers
2020-11-01 10:30 ` Greg KH [this message]
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