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spf=tempfail smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-164-Ygni4Ss9MU6AGDjBO5hwkA-1; Mon, 14 Dec 2020 06:01:06 -0500 X-MC-Unique: Ygni4Ss9MU6AGDjBO5hwkA-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9FDF9814415; Mon, 14 Dec 2020 11:00:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (colo-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.21]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7D7671975F; Mon, 14 Dec 2020 11:00:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.19.33]) by colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E6A55002E; Mon, 14 Dec 2020 11:00:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.3]) by lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 0BC0DsON000850 for ; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 19:13:55 -0500 Received: by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) id DFA5C1111A59; Sat, 12 Dec 2020 00:13:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast02.extmail.prod.ext.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.55.18]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DB7E51111A51 for ; Sat, 12 Dec 2020 00:13:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-2.mimecast.com [207.211.31.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 823AB8007D9 for ; Sat, 12 Dec 2020 00:13:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-413-DZamhoLANGyRU5fHQG8XPQ-1; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 19:13:50 -0500 X-MC-Unique: DZamhoLANGyRU5fHQG8XPQ-1 Received: from sequoia (162-237-133-238.lightspeed.rcsntx.sbcglobal.net [162.237.133.238]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5BFD120B717B; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 16:13:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 5BFD120B717B Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 18:13:43 -0600 From: Tyler Hicks To: Tushar Sugandhi Message-ID: <20201212001343.GE4951@sequoia> References: <20201211235807.30815-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> <20201211235807.30815-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20201211235807.30815-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.3 X-loop: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 06:00:28 -0500 Cc: sashal@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, snitzer@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, agk@redhat.com Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 2020-12-11 15:58:02, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer > data. However, various data structures, policies, and states > stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. > Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These > kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently, > IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure > their integrity critical data. > > Define a new IMA hook - ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel > integrity critical data. > > Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Tyler > --- > include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++ > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + > security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index ac3d82f962f2..675f54db6264 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); > extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); > extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); > +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > + const void *buf, int buf_len, > + bool measure_buf_hash); > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM > extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void); > @@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) > } > > static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} > +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > + const void *buf, int buf_len, > + bool measure_buf_hash) {} > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ > > #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index fa3044a7539f..7d9deda6a8b3 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) > hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ > hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ > hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ > + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ > hook(MAX_CHECK, none) > > #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, > * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= > * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. > * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK > - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK > + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA > * mask: contains the permission mask > * fsmagic: hex value > * > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 0f8409d77602..dff4bce4fb09 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) > fdput(f); > } > > +/** > + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data > + * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry > + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure > + * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) > + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash > + * > + * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, > + * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. > + * > + * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. > + * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, > + * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity > + * of the system. > + * > + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, > + * else measure the buffer data itself. > + * @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured > + * is too large. > + * > + * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised. > + */ > +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > + const void *buf, int buf_len, > + bool measure_buf_hash) > +{ > + if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) > + return; > + > + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, > + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, > + measure_buf_hash); > +} > + > static int __init init_ima(void) > { > int error; > -- > 2.17.1 > -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-23.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1550C5AD2B for ; Sat, 12 Dec 2020 01:01:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ACCB123770 for ; Sat, 12 Dec 2020 01:01:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2395008AbgLLAOw (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Dec 2020 19:14:52 -0500 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:56822 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389275AbgLLAO3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Dec 2020 19:14:29 -0500 Received: from sequoia (162-237-133-238.lightspeed.rcsntx.sbcglobal.net [162.237.133.238]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5BFD120B717B; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 16:13:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 5BFD120B717B DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1607732028; bh=J4T3fJj4p9fqeSZhjR49wzXu76bzrKvsGoakDtGMpRg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=ISm5PIapPGVFsbLta5feYiGOqSo+05ZuXwfztAFSr8g7kZUuCi9k9GZ7gQAFAgKDE hALQ9gB6RT86EsGPaY7QfYeIm6E9TNY+TwWyq62Ia803vjNxX61kJJUFPCJ4ptG/uF XzvDMf3+vCE23bGmoGyuWrlQOj73B2RhImTtCNv4= Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 18:13:43 -0600 From: Tyler Hicks To: Tushar Sugandhi Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Message-ID: <20201212001343.GE4951@sequoia> References: <20201211235807.30815-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> <20201211235807.30815-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20201211235807.30815-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On 2020-12-11 15:58:02, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer > data. However, various data structures, policies, and states > stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. > Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These > kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently, > IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure > their integrity critical data. > > Define a new IMA hook - ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel > integrity critical data. > > Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Tyler > --- > include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++ > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + > security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index ac3d82f962f2..675f54db6264 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); > extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); > extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); > +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > + const void *buf, int buf_len, > + bool measure_buf_hash); > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM > extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void); > @@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) > } > > static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} > +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > + const void *buf, int buf_len, > + bool measure_buf_hash) {} > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ > > #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index fa3044a7539f..7d9deda6a8b3 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) > hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ > hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ > hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ > + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ > hook(MAX_CHECK, none) > > #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, > * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= > * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. > * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK > - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK > + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA > * mask: contains the permission mask > * fsmagic: hex value > * > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 0f8409d77602..dff4bce4fb09 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) > fdput(f); > } > > +/** > + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data > + * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry > + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure > + * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) > + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash > + * > + * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, > + * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. > + * > + * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. > + * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, > + * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity > + * of the system. > + * > + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, > + * else measure the buffer data itself. > + * @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured > + * is too large. > + * > + * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised. > + */ > +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > + const void *buf, int buf_len, > + bool measure_buf_hash) > +{ > + if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) > + return; > + > + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, > + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, > + measure_buf_hash); > +} > + > static int __init init_ima(void) > { > int error; > -- > 2.17.1 >