From: "akuster" <akuster808@gmail.com>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Cc: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Subject: [dunfell][PATCH] xorg: Security fix for CVE-2020-14345
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:15:12 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210114181512.4033-1-akuster808@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Source: freedesktop.org
MR: 105894
Type: Security Fix
Disposition: Backport from https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/f7cd1276bbd4fe3a9700096dec33b52b8440788d
ChangeID: 2c6b7553d8e5bc152258ad1794d95cb7d8b215eb
Description:
CVE-2020-14345 fix
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
.../xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch | 182 ++++++++++++++++++
.../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.8.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 183 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fb3a37c4748
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+From f7cd1276bbd4fe3a9700096dec33b52b8440788d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
+Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:46:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames()
+
+CVE-2020-14345 / ZDI 11428
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2020-14345
+Affects < 1.20.9
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
+
+Index: xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c
+===================================================================
+--- xorg-server-1.20.8.orig/xkb/xkb.c
++++ xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,19 @@ static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
+ #define CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE(err,first,num,r) \
+ CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE2(err,first,num,r,client->errorValue,BadValue)
+
++static Bool
++_XkbCheckRequestBounds(ClientPtr client, void *stuff, void *from, void *to) {
++ char *cstuff = (char *)stuff;
++ char *cfrom = (char *)from;
++ char *cto = (char *)to;
++
++ return cfrom < cto &&
++ cfrom >= cstuff &&
++ cfrom < cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2) &&
++ cto >= cstuff &&
++ cto <= cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2);
++}
++
+ /***====================================================================***/
+
+ int
+@@ -4045,6 +4058,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x04, stuff->firstType);
+ return BadAccess;
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nTypes))
++ return BadLength;
+ old = tmp;
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nTypes, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+@@ -4074,6 +4089,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ }
+ width = (CARD8 *) tmp;
+ tmp = (CARD32 *) (((char *) tmp) + XkbPaddedSize(stuff->nKTLevels));
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, width, tmp))
++ return BadLength;
+ type = &xkb->map->types[stuff->firstKTLevel];
+ for (i = 0; i < stuff->nKTLevels; i++, type++) {
+ if (width[i] == 0)
+@@ -4083,6 +4100,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ type->num_levels, width[i]);
+ return BadMatch;
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + width[i]))
++ return BadLength;
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, width[i], client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ client->errorValue = bad;
+@@ -4095,6 +4114,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ client->errorValue = 0x08;
+ return BadMatch;
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
++ tmp + Ones(stuff->indicators)))
++ return BadLength;
+ tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumIndicators, stuff->indicators,
+ client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+@@ -4107,6 +4129,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ client->errorValue = 0x09;
+ return BadMatch;
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
++ tmp + Ones(stuff->virtualMods)))
++ return BadLength;
+ tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumVirtualMods,
+ (CARD32) stuff->virtualMods,
+ client->swapped, &bad);
+@@ -4120,6 +4145,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ client->errorValue = 0x0a;
+ return BadMatch;
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
++ tmp + Ones(stuff->groupNames)))
++ return BadLength;
+ tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumKbdGroups,
+ (CARD32) stuff->groupNames,
+ client->swapped, &bad);
+@@ -4141,9 +4169,14 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ stuff->nKeys);
+ return BadValue;
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nKeys))
++ return BadLength;
+ tmp += stuff->nKeys;
+ }
+ if ((stuff->which & XkbKeyAliasesMask) && (stuff->nKeyAliases > 0)) {
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
++ tmp + (stuff->nKeyAliases * 2)))
++ return BadLength;
+ tmp += stuff->nKeyAliases * 2;
+ }
+ if (stuff->which & XkbRGNamesMask) {
+@@ -4151,6 +4184,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
+ client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x0d, stuff->nRadioGroups);
+ return BadValue;
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
++ tmp + stuff->nRadioGroups))
++ return BadLength;
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nRadioGroups, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ client->errorValue = bad;
+@@ -4344,6 +4380,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
+ /* check device-independent stuff */
+ tmp = (CARD32 *) &stuff[1];
+
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
++ return BadLength;
+ if (stuff->which & XkbKeycodesNameMask) {
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+@@ -4351,6 +4389,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
+ return BadAtom;
+ }
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
++ return BadLength;
+ if (stuff->which & XkbGeometryNameMask) {
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+@@ -4358,6 +4398,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
+ return BadAtom;
+ }
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
++ return BadLength;
+ if (stuff->which & XkbSymbolsNameMask) {
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+@@ -4365,6 +4407,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
+ return BadAtom;
+ }
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
++ return BadLength;
+ if (stuff->which & XkbPhysSymbolsNameMask) {
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+@@ -4372,6 +4416,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
+ return BadAtom;
+ }
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
++ return BadLength;
+ if (stuff->which & XkbTypesNameMask) {
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
+@@ -4379,6 +4425,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
+ return BadAtom;
+ }
+ }
++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
++ return BadLength;
+ if (stuff->which & XkbCompatNameMask) {
+ tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
+ if (!tmp) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.8.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.8.bb
index 51d959f86c2..2af1b6f3072 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.8.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.8.bb
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat
file://CVE-2020-14346.patch \
file://CVE-2020-14361.patch \
file://CVE-2020-14362.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-14345.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a770aec600116444a953ff632f51f839"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d17b646bee4ba0fb7850c1cc55b18e3e8513ed5c02bdf38da7e107f84e2d0146"
--
2.17.1
reply other threads:[~2021-01-14 18:15 UTC|newest]
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