From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 12:27:34 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202102041226.D3E2B437@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210203225547.32221-19-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 02:55:40PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Can_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the
> FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.
>
> Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes
> read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty. Thus, in the
> can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and
> should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check. Apply
> the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().
Does this need the vma passed down? Should it just pass vm_flags? I
suppose it doesn't really matter, though.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
> mm/gup.c | 8 +++++---
> mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++---
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
> index e4c224cd9661..66ab67626f57 100644
> --- a/mm/gup.c
> +++ b/mm/gup.c
> @@ -357,10 +357,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
> * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
> */
> -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
> +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> return pte_write(pte) ||
> - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
> + ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte) &&
> + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
> }
>
> static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> @@ -403,7 +405,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> }
> if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
> goto no_page;
> - if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
> + if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags, vma)) {
> pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
> return NULL;
> }
> diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
> index bfec65c9308b..eb64e2b56bc9 100644
> --- a/mm/huge_memory.c
> +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
> @@ -1337,10 +1337,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
> * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
> * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
> */
> -static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
> +static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> return pmd_write(pmd) ||
> - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
> + ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd) &&
> + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
> }
>
> struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> @@ -1353,7 +1355,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>
> assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
>
> - if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
> + if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags, vma))
> goto out;
>
> /* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
> --
> 2.21.0
>
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-04 20:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-03 22:55 [PATCH v19 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:52 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:03 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:56 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-05 0:05 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:58 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-05 13:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-05 16:15 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:59 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:09 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-05 0:10 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 13:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-05 18:00 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 18:29 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-08 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-08 18:50 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-08 18:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-08 19:23 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-08 19:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-08 20:11 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:10 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:19 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:27 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-05 18:41 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-08 23:03 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 18:58 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:21 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:46 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2021-02-04 21:48 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:22 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:22 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:27 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:33 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:35 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 23:41 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 18:26 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
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