From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
willy@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, roman.fietze@magna.com,
keescook@chromium.org, john.ogness@linutronix.de,
akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 23:11:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210204221143.GB13103@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <873d7e08-7a70-a1a3-f486-882d1d515965@kernel.org>
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On Thu 2021-02-04 15:59:21, Timur Tabi wrote:
> On 2/4/21 3:49 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
> >This machine is insecure. Yet I don't see ascii-art *** all around..
> >
> >"Kernel memory addresses are exposed, which is bad for security."
>
> I'll use whatever wording everyone can agree on, but I really don't see much
> difference between "which may compromise security on your system" and "which
> is bad for security". "may compromise" doesn't see any more alarmist than
> "bad". Frankly, "bad" is a very generic term.
Well, I agree that "bad" is vague.... but original wording is simply
untrue, as printing addresses decreases robustness but can't introduce
security problem on its own.
Being alarmist is not my complaint; being untrue is.
Best regards,
Pavel
--
http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-04 22:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-02 20:18 [PATCH] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-02 22:19 ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 22:34 ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-02 22:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-02-03 18:53 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:48 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 20:54 ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04 21:49 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 21:59 ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-04 22:06 ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04 22:11 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2021-02-04 22:17 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 22:20 ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-04 22:51 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:57 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:05 ` Steven Rostedt
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