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From: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
To: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, borntraeger@de.ibm.com,
	frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	david@redhat.com, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 00/11] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 18:04:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210518180411.4abf837d.cohuck@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210518173624.13d043e3@ibm-vm>

On Tue, 18 May 2021 17:36:24 +0200
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> wrote:

> On Tue, 18 May 2021 17:05:37 +0200
> Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Mon, 17 May 2021 22:07:47 +0200
> > Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> wrote:

> > > This means that the same address space can have memory belonging to
> > > more than one protected guest, although only one will be running,
> > > the others will in fact not even have any CPUs.    
> > 
> > Are those set-aside-but-not-yet-cleaned-up pages still possibly
> > accessible in any way? I would assume that they only belong to the  
> 
> in case of reboot: yes, they are still in the address space of the
> guest, and can be swapped if needed
> 
> > 'zombie' guests, and any new or rebooted guest is a new entity that
> > needs to get new pages?  
> 
> the rebooted guest (normal or secure) will re-use the same pages of the
> old guest (before or after cleanup, which is the reason of patches 3
> and 4)

Took a look at those patches, makes sense.

> 
> the KVM guest is not affected in case of reboot, so the userspace
> address space is not touched.

'guest' is a bit ambiguous here -- do you mean the vm here, and the
actual guest above?


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-18 16:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-17 20:07 [PATCH v1 00/11] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 01/11] KVM: s390: pv: leak the ASCE page when destroy fails Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 10:26   ` Janosch Frank
2021-05-18 10:40     ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 12:00       ` Janosch Frank
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 02/11] KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guests Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 03/11] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations " Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 04/11] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage exceptions for normal guests Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 05/11] KVM: s390: pv: refactor s390_reset_acc Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-26 12:11   ` Janosch Frank
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 06/11] KVM: s390: pv: usage counter instead of flag Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-27  9:29   ` Janosch Frank
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 07/11] KVM: s390: pv: add export before import Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-26 11:56   ` Janosch Frank
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 08/11] KVM: s390: pv: lazy destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-27  9:43   ` Janosch Frank
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 09/11] KVM: s390: pv: extend lazy destroy to handle shutdown Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 10/11] KVM: s390: pv: module parameter to fence lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-27 10:35   ` Janosch Frank
2021-05-17 20:07 ` [PATCH v1 11/11] KVM: s390: pv: add support for UV feature bits Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 15:05 ` [PATCH v1 00/11] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy Cornelia Huck
2021-05-18 15:36   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 15:45     ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-05-18 15:52       ` Cornelia Huck
2021-05-18 16:13       ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 16:20         ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-05-18 16:34           ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 16:35             ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-05-18 16:04     ` Cornelia Huck [this message]
2021-05-18 16:19       ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 16:22         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 16:31           ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-05-18 16:55             ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-05-18 17:00               ` Claudio Imbrenda

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