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From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chomium.org>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] kasan: use fortified strings for hwaddress sanitizer
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 17:00:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211013150025.2875883-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211013150025.2875883-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

GCC has separate macros for -fsanitize=kernel-address and
-fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress, and the check in the arm64 string.h
gets this wrong, which leads to string functions not getting
fortified with gcc. The newly added tests find this:

warning: unsafe memchr() usage lacked '__read_overflow' warning in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/read_overflow-memchr.c
warning: unsafe memchr_inv() usage lacked '__read_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/read_overflow-memchr_inv.c
warning: unsafe memcmp() usage lacked '__read_overflow' warning in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/read_overflow-memcmp.c
warning: unsafe memscan() usage lacked '__read_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/read_overflow-memscan.c
warning: unsafe memcmp() usage lacked '__read_overflow2' warning in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/read_overflow2-memcmp.c
warning: unsafe memcpy() usage lacked '__read_overflow2' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/read_overflow2-memcpy.c
warning: unsafe memmove() usage lacked '__read_overflow2' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/read_overflow2-memmove.c
warning: unsafe memcpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-memcpy.c
warning: unsafe memmove() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-memmove.c
warning: unsafe memset() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-memset.c
warning: unsafe strcpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strcpy-lit.c
warning: unsafe strcpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strcpy.c
warning: unsafe strlcpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strlcpy-src.c
warning: unsafe strlcpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strlcpy.c
warning: unsafe strncpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strncpy-src.c
warning: unsafe strncpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strncpy.c
warning: unsafe strscpy() usage lacked '__write_overflow' symbol in /git/arm-soc/lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strscpy.c

Add a workaround to include/linux/compiler_types.h so we always
define __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ for either mode, as we already do
for clang.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 include/linux/compiler_types.h | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
index aad6f6408bfa..2f2776fffefe 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
@@ -178,6 +178,13 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
  */
 #define noinline_for_stack noinline
 
+/*
+ * Treat __SANITIZE_HWADDRESS__ the same as __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ in the kernel
+ */
+#ifdef __SANITIZE_HWADDRESS__
+#define __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Sanitizer helper attributes: Because using __always_inline and
  * __no_sanitize_* conflict, provide helper attributes that will either expand
-- 
2.29.2


  reply	other threads:[~2021-10-13 15:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-13 15:00 [PATCH 1/2] kasan: test: use underlying string helpers Arnd Bergmann
2021-10-13 15:00 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2021-10-18 19:57   ` [PATCH 2/2] kasan: use fortified strings for hwaddress sanitizer Kees Cook
2021-10-18 20:09     ` Arnd Bergmann
2021-10-14  8:12 ` [PATCH 1/2] kasan: test: use underlying string helpers Vincenzo Frascino
2021-10-15  2:40   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-28 20:15     ` Andrew Morton
2021-10-28 20:42       ` Kees Cook
2021-10-18 19:47 ` Kees Cook
2021-10-18 19:55   ` Arnd Bergmann

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