From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v0 03/12] x86/mce: Use mce_rdmsrl() in severity checking code
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 15:40:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211104144035.20107-4-bp@alien8.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211104144035.20107-1-bp@alien8.de>
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
MCA has its own special MSR accessors. Use them.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
index 0dcd7ac7444c..c660008ccd4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ void ex_handler_msr_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wrmsr)
}
/* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
-static noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
+noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
{
DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
index acd61c41846c..52c633950b38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -207,4 +207,6 @@ static inline void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) {}
static inline void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) {}
#endif
+noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr);
+
#endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
index bb019a594a2c..00e97ebbd94a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -288,8 +288,7 @@ static int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
static int mce_severity_amd_smca(struct mce *m, enum context err_ctx)
{
- u32 addr = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(m->bank);
- u32 low, high;
+ u64 mcx_cfg;
/*
* We need to look at the following bits:
@@ -300,11 +299,10 @@ static int mce_severity_amd_smca(struct mce *m, enum context err_ctx)
if (!mce_flags.succor)
return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
- if (rdmsr_safe(addr, &low, &high))
- return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ mcx_cfg = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(m->bank));
/* TCC (Task context corrupt). If set and if IN_KERNEL, panic. */
- if ((low & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX) &&
+ if ((mcx_cfg & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX) &&
(m->status & MCI_STATUS_TCC) &&
(err_ctx == IN_KERNEL))
return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
--
2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-04 14:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-04 14:40 [PATCH v0 00/12] x86/mce: Correct the noinstr annotation Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 01/12] x86/mce: Do not use memset to clear the banks bitmaps Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 02/12] x86/mce: Remove function-local cpus variables Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 04/12] x86/mce: Remove noinstr annotation from mce_setup() Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 05/12] x86/mce: Allow instrumentation during task work queueing Borislav Petkov
2021-11-09 22:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 06/12] x86/mce: Prevent severity computation from being instrumented Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 07/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_panic() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 08/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_end() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 09/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_read_aux() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 10/12] x86/mce: Move the tainting outside of the noinstr region Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 11/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_timed_out() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 12/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_start() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-09 22:08 ` [PATCH v0 00/12] x86/mce: Correct the noinstr annotation Peter Zijlstra
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20211104144035.20107-4-bp@alien8.de \
--to=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.