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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.14 12/24] binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 19:44:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211110182003.724807094@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211110182003.342919058@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>

commit 4d5b5539742d2554591751b4248b0204d20dcc9d upstream.

Use the 'struct cred' saved at binder_open() to lookup
the security ID via security_cred_getsecid(). This
ensures that the security context that opened binder
is the one used to generate the secctx.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Fixes: ec74136ded79 ("binder: create node flag to request sender's security context")
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/android/binder.c |   11 +----------
 include/linux/security.h |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2722,16 +2722,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct bi
 		u32 secid;
 		size_t added_size;
 
-		/*
-		 * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but
-		 * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task
-		 * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which
-		 * are safe to access.  The downside is that if a task is
-		 * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected
-		 * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
-		 * case well anyway.
-		 */
-		security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
+		security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
 		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
 		if (ret) {
 			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1041,6 +1041,11 @@ static inline void security_transfer_cre
 {
 }
 
+static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-10 18:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-10 18:43 [PATCH 5.14 00/24] 5.14.18-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:43 ` [PATCH 5.14 01/24] ALSA: pcm: Check mmap capability of runtime dma buffer at first Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:43 ` [PATCH 5.14 02/24] ALSA: pci: cs46xx: Fix set up buffer type properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:43 ` [PATCH 5.14 03/24] KVM: x86: avoid warning with -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:43 ` [PATCH 5.14 04/24] Revert "x86/kvm: fix vcpu-id indexed array sizes" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:43 ` [PATCH 5.14 05/24] usb: ehci: handshake CMD_RUN instead of STS_HALT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:43 ` [PATCH 5.14 06/24] usb: gadget: Mark USB_FSL_QE broken on 64-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:43 ` [PATCH 5.14 07/24] usb: musb: Balance list entry in musb_gadget_queue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 08/24] usb-storage: Add compatibility quirk flags for iODD 2531/2541 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 09/24] Revert "proc/wchan: use printk format instead of lookup_symbol_name()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 10/24] binder: use euid from cred instead of using task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 11/24] binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 13/24] binder: dont detect sender/target during buffer cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 14/24] staging: rtl8712: fix use-after-free in rtl8712_dl_fw Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 15/24] isofs: Fix out of bound access for corrupted isofs image Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 16/24] comedi: dt9812: fix DMA buffers on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 17/24] comedi: ni_usb6501: fix NULL-deref in command paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 18/24] comedi: vmk80xx: fix transfer-buffer overflows Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 19/24] comedi: vmk80xx: fix bulk-buffer overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 20/24] comedi: vmk80xx: fix bulk and interrupt message timeouts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 21/24] staging: r8712u: fix control-message timeout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 22/24] staging: rtl8192u: fix control-message timeouts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 23/24] media: staging/intel-ipu3: css: Fix wrong size comparison imgu_css_fw_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 18:44 ` [PATCH 5.14 24/24] rsi: fix control-message timeout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-10 23:09 ` [PATCH 5.14 00/24] 5.14.18-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2021-11-11 10:06 ` Naresh Kamboju
2021-11-11 14:30 ` Fox Chen
2021-11-11 16:28 ` Shuah Khan
2021-11-12  1:16 ` Guenter Roeck
2021-11-12 15:41 ` Jon Hunter

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