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From: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To: buildroot@buildroot.org
Cc: Daniel Price <daniel.price@gmail.com>, Martin Bark <martin@barkynet.com>
Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/nodejs: security bump to version 14.18.3
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 11:38:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220114103825.1529-1-peter@korsgaard.com> (raw)

Fixes the following security issues:

Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)

Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI is
specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in bypassing
name-constrained intermediates.  Node.js was accepting URI SAN types, which
PKIs are often not defined to use.  Additionally, when a protocol allows URI
SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.

Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)

Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.  It
uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections.  The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate chain,
allowing the bypass of these name constraints.

Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)

Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names correctly.
Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a single-value
Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a multi-value
Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject a Common Name
that would allow bypassing the certificate subject verification.

Prototype pollution via console.table properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)

Due to the formatting logic of the console.table() function it was not safe
to allow user controlled input to be passed to the properties parameter
while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one property as
the first parameter, which could be __proto__.  The prototype pollution has
very limited control, in that it only allows an empty string to be assigned
numerical keys of the object prototype.

For details, see the advisory:
https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/jan-2022-security-releases/

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
 package/nodejs/nodejs.hash | 4 ++--
 package/nodejs/nodejs.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/package/nodejs/nodejs.hash b/package/nodejs/nodejs.hash
index f330757341..6365ef852b 100644
--- a/package/nodejs/nodejs.hash
+++ b/package/nodejs/nodejs.hash
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-# From https://nodejs.org/dist/v14.18.2/SHASUMS256.txt
-sha256  3e8a9ce10f8bcd3628eb6dd049f7f03c84ba9219be6f9743e2221154b9cc680b  node-v14.18.2.tar.xz
+# From https://nodejs.org/dist/v14.18.3/SHASUMS256.txt
+sha256  783ac443cd343dd6c68d2abcf7e59e7b978a6a428f6a6025f9b84918b769d608  node-v14.18.3.tar.xz
 
 # Hash for license file
 sha256  b3a67885b5a6ac35e8bbe8190509e41b79b0d9a2e3fbd47186f2ac4727f63be5  LICENSE
diff --git a/package/nodejs/nodejs.mk b/package/nodejs/nodejs.mk
index 7d5c93eb93..727af6dc50 100644
--- a/package/nodejs/nodejs.mk
+++ b/package/nodejs/nodejs.mk
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-NODEJS_VERSION = 14.18.2
+NODEJS_VERSION = 14.18.3
 NODEJS_SOURCE = node-v$(NODEJS_VERSION).tar.xz
 NODEJS_SITE = http://nodejs.org/dist/v$(NODEJS_VERSION)
 NODEJS_DEPENDENCIES = host-qemu host-python3 host-nodejs c-ares \
-- 
2.20.1

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             reply	other threads:[~2022-01-14 10:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-14 10:38 Peter Korsgaard [this message]
2022-01-17 21:37 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/nodejs: security bump to version 14.18.3 Yann E. MORIN
2022-01-28 17:03 ` Peter Korsgaard

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