From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
To: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] hw_random: use rng_fillbuf in add_early_randomness()
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 21:29:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220124202951.28579-3-linux@dominikbrodowski.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220124202951.28579-1-linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Using rng_buffer in add_early_randomness() may race with rng_dev_read().
Use rng_fillbuf instead, as it is otherwise only used within the kernel
by hwrng_fillfn() and therefore never exposed to userspace.
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
---
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index c2d260b5dd92..89891ac87af0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
int bytes_read;
mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
- bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer, 32, 0);
+ bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf, 32, 0);
mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
if (bytes_read > 0)
- add_device_randomness(rng_buffer, bytes_read);
+ add_device_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read);
}
static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-24 20:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-24 20:29 [PATCH 1/6] hw_random: explicit ordering of initcalls Dominik Brodowski
2022-01-24 20:29 ` [PATCH 2/6] hw_random: read() callback must be called for size of 32 or more bytes Dominik Brodowski
2022-01-24 20:29 ` Dominik Brodowski [this message]
2022-01-24 20:29 ` [PATCH 4/6] hw_random: only set cur_rng_set_by_user if it is working Dominik Brodowski
2022-01-24 20:29 ` [PATCH 5/6] hw_random: break out of hwrng_fillfn if current rng is not trusted Dominik Brodowski
2022-01-24 20:29 ` [PATCH 6/6] hw_random: credit entropy for low quality sources of randomness Dominik Brodowski
2022-01-28 7:02 ` [PATCH v2 " Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-05 4:30 ` [PATCH 1/6] hw_random: explicit ordering of initcalls Herbert Xu
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