[kvm-unit-tests PATCH v3 5/5] s390x: uv-guest: Add attestation tests

[Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>]

Adds several tests to verify correct error paths of attestation.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
---
 lib/s390x/asm/uv.h |   5 +-
 s390x/uv-guest.c   | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
index c330c0f8..e5f7aa72 100644
--- a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
+++ b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ struct uv_cb_qui {
 	u8  reserved88[158 - 136];	/* 0x0088 */
 	uint16_t max_guest_cpus;	/* 0x009e */
 	u64 uv_feature_indications;	/* 0x00a0 */
-	u8  reserveda8[200 - 168];	/* 0x00a8 */
+	uint8_t  reserveda8[224 - 168];	/* 0x00a8 */
+	uint64_t supp_att_hdr_ver;	/* 0x00e0 */
+	uint64_t supp_paf;		/* 0x00e8 */
+	uint8_t  reservedf0[256 - 240];	/* 0x00f0 */
 }  __attribute__((packed))  __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
 struct uv_cb_cgc {
diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
index 77057bd2..77edbba2 100644
--- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
+++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
 /*
  * Guest Ultravisor Call tests
  *
- * Copyright (c) 2020 IBM Corp
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2020, 2022
  *
  * Authors:
  *  Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
+ *  Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
  */
 
 #include <libcflat.h>
@@ -53,6 +54,15 @@ static void test_priv(void)
 	check_pgm_int_code(PGM_INT_CODE_PRIVILEGED_OPERATION);
 	report_prefix_pop();
 
+	report_prefix_push("attest");
+	uvcb.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION;
+	uvcb.len = sizeof(struct uv_cb_attest);
+	expect_pgm_int();
+	enter_pstate();
+	uv_call_once(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	check_pgm_int_code(PGM_INT_CODE_PRIVILEGED_OPERATION);
+	report_prefix_pop();
+
 	report_prefix_pop();
 }
 
@@ -111,7 +121,187 @@ static void test_sharing(void)
 	cc = uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb);
 	report(cc == 0 && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_EXECUTED, "unshare");
 	report_prefix_pop();
+}
+
+#define ARCB_VERSION_NONE 0
+#define ARCB_VERSION_1 0x0100
+#define ARCB_MEAS_NONE 0
+#define ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512 1
+#define MEASUREMENT_SIZE_HMAC_SHA512 64
+#define PAF_PHKH_ATT (1ULL << 61)
+#define ADDITIONAL_SIZE_PAF_PHKH_ATT 32
+/* arcb with one key slot and no nonce */
+struct uv_arcb_v1 {
+	uint64_t reserved0;		/* 0x0000 */
+	uint32_t req_ver;		/* 0x0008 */
+	uint32_t req_len;		/* 0x000c */
+	uint8_t  iv[12];		/* 0x0010 */
+	uint32_t reserved1c;		/* 0x001c */
+	uint8_t  reserved20[7];		/* 0x0020 */
+	uint8_t  nks;			/* 0x0027 */
+	uint32_t reserved28;		/* 0x0028 */
+	uint32_t sea;			/* 0x002c */
+	uint64_t plaint_att_flags;	/* 0x0030 */
+	uint32_t meas_alg_id;		/* 0x0038 */
+	uint32_t reserved3c;		/* 0x003c */
+	uint8_t  cpk[160];		/* 0x0040 */
+	uint8_t  key_slot[80];		/* 0x00e0 */
+	uint8_t  meas_key[64];		/* 0x0130 */
+	uint8_t  tag[16];		/* 0x0170 */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct attest_request_v1 {
+	struct uv_arcb_v1 arcb;
+	uint8_t measurement[MEASUREMENT_SIZE_HMAC_SHA512];
+	uint8_t additional[ADDITIONAL_SIZE_PAF_PHKH_ATT];
+};
+
+static void test_attest_v1(u64 supported_paf)
+{
+	struct uv_cb_attest uvcb = {
+		.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION,
+		.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+	};
+	struct attest_request_v1 *attest_req = (void *)page;
+	struct uv_arcb_v1 *arcb = &attest_req->arcb;
+	int cc;
+
+	memset((void *)page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a minimal arcb/uvcb such that FW has everything to start
+	 * unsealing the request. However, this unsealing will fail as the
+	 * kvm-unit-test framework provides no cryptography functions that
+	 * would be needed to seal such requests.
+	 */
+	arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_1;
+	arcb->req_len = sizeof(*arcb);
+	arcb->nks = 1;
+	arcb->sea = sizeof(arcb->meas_key);
+	arcb->plaint_att_flags = PAF_PHKH_ATT;
+	arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512;
+	uvcb.arcb_addr = (uint64_t)&attest_req->arcb;
+	uvcb.measurement_address = (uint64_t)attest_req->measurement;
+	uvcb.measurement_length = sizeof(attest_req->measurement);
+	uvcb.add_data_address = (uint64_t)attest_req->additional;
+	uvcb.add_data_length = sizeof(attest_req->additional);
+
+	uvcb.continuation_token = 0xff;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0101, "invalid continuation token");
+	uvcb.continuation_token = 0;
+
+	uvcb.user_data_length = sizeof(uvcb.user_data) + 1;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0102, "invalid user data size");
+	uvcb.user_data_length = 0;
+
+	uvcb.arcb_addr = get_ram_size() + PAGE_SIZE;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0103, "invalid address arcb");
+	uvcb.arcb_addr = page;
+
+	/* 0104 - 0105 need an unseal-able request */
+
+	arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_NONE;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0106, "unsupported version");
+	arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_1;
+
+	arcb->req_len += 1;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0107, "invalid arcb size 1");
+	arcb->req_len -= 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * The arcb needs to grow as well if number of key slots (nks)
+	 * is increased. However, this is not the case and there is no explicit
+	 * 'too many/less nks for that arcb size' error code -> expect 0x0107
+	 */
+	arcb->nks = 2;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0107, "invalid arcb size 2");
+	arcb->nks = 1;
+
+	arcb->nks = 0;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0108, "invalid num key slots");
+	arcb->nks = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Possible valid size (when using nonce).
+	 * However, req_len too small to host a nonce
+	 */
+	arcb->sea = 80;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0109, "invalid encrypted size 1");
+	arcb->sea = 17;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x0109, "invalid encrypted size 2");
+	arcb->sea = 64;
+
+	arcb->plaint_att_flags = supported_paf ^ GENMASK_ULL(63, 0);
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x010a, "invalid flag");
+	arcb->plaint_att_flags = PAF_PHKH_ATT;
+
+	arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_NONE;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x010b, "invalid measurement algorithm");
+	arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512;
 
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x010c, "unable unseal");
+
+	uvcb.measurement_length = 0;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x010d, "invalid measurement size");
+	uvcb.measurement_length = sizeof(attest_req->measurement);
+
+	uvcb.add_data_length = 0;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x010e, "invalid additional size");
+	uvcb.add_data_length = sizeof(attest_req->additional);
+}
+
+static void test_attest(void)
+{
+	struct uv_cb_attest uvcb = {
+		.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION,
+		.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+	};
+	const struct uv_cb_qui *uvcb_qui = uv_get_query_data();
+	int cc;
+
+	report_prefix_push("attest");
+
+	if (!uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION)) {
+		report_skip("Attestation not supported.");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Verify that the UV supports at least one header version */
+	report(uvcb_qui->supp_att_hdr_ver, "has hdr support");
+
+	memset((void *)page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	uvcb.header.len -= 1;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_INV_LEN, "invalid uvcb size 1");
+	uvcb.header.len += 1;
+
+	uvcb.header.len += 1;
+	cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+	report(cc && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_INV_LEN, "invalid uvcb size 2");
+	uvcb.header.len -= 1;
+
+	report_prefix_push("v1");
+	if (test_bit_inv(0, &uvcb_qui->supp_att_hdr_ver))
+		test_attest_v1(uvcb_qui->supp_paf);
+	else
+		report_skip("Attestation version 1 not supported");
+	report_prefix_pop();
+done:
 	report_prefix_pop();
 }
 
@@ -193,6 +383,7 @@ int main(void)
 	test_invalid();
 	test_query();
 	test_sharing();
+	test_attest();
 	free_page((void *)page);
 done:
 	report_prefix_pop();
-- 
2.30.2