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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 08/18] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
Date: Wed,  9 Mar 2022 16:59:45 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155856.404068474@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155856.155540075@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>

commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.

Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the specu
 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
 execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
 
 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
 ---------------------------------------
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers:
 
 .. _spec_ref6:
 
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
 
 ARM white papers:
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-09 15:59 [PATCH 4.19 00/18] 4.19.234-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 01/18] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 02/18] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 03/18] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 04/18] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 05/18] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 06/18] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 07/18] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 09/18] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 10/18] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 11/18] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 12/18] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 13/18] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 14/18] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 15/18] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 16/18] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 17/18] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.19 18/18] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.19 00/18] 4.19.234-rc1 review Sudip Mukherjee
2022-03-09 18:15   ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-03-09 18:21     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10  9:41       ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-03-10  9:51         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 18:24   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10  9:51     ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-03-10 12:25       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:09   ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-09 19:08 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 20:25 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 11:33 ` Pavel Machek
2022-03-11  1:11 ` Samuel Zou

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