From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.16 06/37] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 17:00:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155859.273485501@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155859.086952723@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.
Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the specu
Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
---------------------------------------
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ AMD white papers:
.. _spec_ref6:
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
ARM white papers:
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-09 16:00 [PATCH 5.16 00/37] 5.16.14-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 01/37] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 02/37] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 03/37] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 04/37] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 05/37] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 07/37] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 08/37] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 09/37] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 10/37] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 11/37] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 12/37] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 13/37] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 14/37] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 15/37] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 16/37] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 17/37] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 18/37] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 19/37] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 20/37] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 21/37] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 22/37] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 23/37] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 24/37] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 25/37] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 26/37] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 27/37] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 28/37] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 29/37] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 23:27 ` Pavel Machek
2022-03-11 8:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-11 8:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 30/37] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 31/37] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 32/37] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 33/37] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 34/37] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 35/37] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 36/37] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 37/37] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:05 ` [PATCH 5.16 00/37] 5.16.14-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-03-09 20:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 21:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 20:23 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-09 21:17 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 21:19 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 21:49 ` Fox Chen
2022-03-10 10:50 ` Bagas Sanjaya
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