From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
"Russell King (Oracle)" <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 24/43] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 13:45:35 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220317124528.347435363@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220317124527.672236844@linuxfoundation.org>
From: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
commit 228a26b912287934789023b4132ba76065d9491c upstream.
Future CPUs may implement a clearbhb instruction that is sufficient
to mitigate SpectreBHB. CPUs that implement this instruction, but
not CSV2.3 must be affected by Spectre-BHB.
Add support to use this instruction as the BHB mitigation on CPUs
that support it. The instruction is in the hint space, so it will
be treated by a NOP as older CPUs.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ modified for stable: Use a KVM vector template instead of alternatives,
removed bitmap of mitigations ]
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 7 +++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h | 7 +++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 8 ++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 6 ++++++
8 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
index 4b13739ca518..01112f9767bc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@
hint #20
.endm
+/*
+ * Clear Branch History instruction
+ */
+ .macro clearbhb
+ hint #22
+ .endm
+
/*
* Speculation barrier
*/
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 40a5e48881af..f63438474dd5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -523,6 +523,19 @@ static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope)
return csv2_val == 3;
}
+static inline bool supports_clearbhb(int scope)
+{
+ u64 isar2;
+
+ if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
+ isar2 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
+ else
+ isar2 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
+
+ return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar2,
+ ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT);
+}
+
static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void)
{
return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
index b35579352856..5b3bdad66b27 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
@@ -577,6 +577,7 @@
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1
/* id_aa64isar2 */
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT 28
#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT 4
#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SHIFT 0
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h
index 1f65c37dc653..f64613a96d53 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
* canonical vectors.
*/
EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW,
+
+ /*
+ * Use the ClearBHB instruction, before branching to the canonical
+ * vectors.
+ */
+ EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN,
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
/*
@@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
#ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP -1
#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW -1
+#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN -1
#endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
/* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 0f74dc2b13c0..33b33416fea4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start[];
extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end[];
extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start[];
extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end[];
+extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start[];
+extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end[];
static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
@@ -1086,6 +1088,7 @@ static void update_mitigation_state(enum mitigation_state *oldp,
* - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed
* in our "loop mitigated list".
* - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call.
+ * - Has the ClearBHB instruction to perform the mitigation.
* - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no
* software mitigation in the vectors is needed.
* - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected.
@@ -1226,6 +1229,9 @@ bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
if (supports_csv2p3(scope))
return false;
+ if (supports_clearbhb(scope))
+ return true;
+
if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope))
return true;
@@ -1266,6 +1272,8 @@ static const char *kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(const char *start)
return __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end;
else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start)
return __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end;
+ else if (start == __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start)
+ return __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end;
return NULL;
}
@@ -1305,6 +1313,7 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start)
#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start NULL
#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start NULL
#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start NULL
+#define __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start NULL
static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { }
#endif
@@ -1323,6 +1332,11 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
+ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+ } else if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
+ kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start);
+ this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN);
+
state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 0d89d535720f..d07dadd6b8ff 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
};
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = {
+ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
ARM64_FTR_END,
};
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index fcfbb2b009e2..296422119488 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -1074,6 +1074,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
#define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE 0
#define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP 1
#define BHB_MITIGATION_FW 2
+#define BHB_MITIGATION_INSN 3
.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti, bhb
.align 7
@@ -1090,6 +1091,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
__mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop x30
.endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
+ .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
+ clearbhb
+ isb
+ .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
+
.if \kpti == 1
/*
* Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy
@@ -1170,6 +1176,7 @@ ENTRY(tramp_vectors)
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW
+ generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_NONE
END(tramp_vectors)
@@ -1232,6 +1239,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW
+ generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
.popsection
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
index b59b66f1f905..99b8ecaae810 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
@@ -405,4 +405,10 @@ ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start)
ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
add sp, sp, #(8 * 2)
ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end)
+
+ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start)
+ esb
+ clearbhb
+ isb
+ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end)
#endif
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-17 12:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-17 12:45 [PATCH 5.4 00/43] 5.4.186-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 01/43] Revert "xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID 0" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 02/43] sctp: fix the processing for INIT chunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 03/43] arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A77 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 04/43] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 05/43] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 06/43] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 07/43] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 08/43] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 09/43] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 10/43] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 11/43] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 12/43] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 13/43] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 14/43] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 15/43] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 16/43] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 17/43] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 20:48 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-18 12:11 ` James Morse
2022-03-18 16:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-18 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-18 17:37 ` fixup for [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64 entry: Add macro for reading symbol address " James Morse
2022-03-19 8:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-18 16:33 ` [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses " Florian Fainelli
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 19/43] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 20/43] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 21/43] KVM: arm64: Add templates for BHB mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 22/43] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 23/43] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 25/43] xfrm: Check if_id in xfrm_migrate Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 26/43] xfrm: Fix xfrm migrate issues when address family changes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 27/43] arm64: dts: rockchip: fix rk3399-puma eMMC HS400 signal integrity Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 28/43] arm64: dts: rockchip: reorder rk3399 hdmi clocks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 29/43] arm64: dts: agilex: use the compatible "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 30/43] ARM: dts: rockchip: reorder rk322x hmdi clocks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 31/43] ARM: dts: rockchip: fix a typo on rk3288 crypto-controller Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 32/43] mac80211: refuse aggregations sessions before authorized Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 33/43] MIPS: smp: fill in sibling and core maps earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 34/43] ARM: 9178/1: fix unmet dependency on BITREVERSE for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 35/43] can: rcar_canfd: rcar_canfd_channel_probe(): register the CAN device when fully ready Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 36/43] atm: firestream: check the return value of ioremap() in fs_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 37/43] iwlwifi: dont advertise TWT support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 38/43] drm/vrr: Set VRR capable prop only if it is attached to connector Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 39/43] nl80211: Update bss channel on channel switch for P2P_CLIENT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 40/43] tcp: make tcp_read_sock() more robust Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 41/43] sfc: extend the locking on mcdi->seqno Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 42/43] bnx2: Fix an error message Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-18 17:32 ` Marion & Christophe JAILLET
2022-03-17 12:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 43/43] kselftest/vm: fix tests build with old libc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-17 20:48 ` [PATCH 5.4 00/43] 5.4.186-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-03-18 2:18 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-18 12:03 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-03-18 13:13 ` Jon Hunter
2022-03-18 16:30 ` Sudip Mukherjee
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