From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
To: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
axboe@kernel.dk, jaegeuk@kernel.org, chao@kernel.org,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Daeho Jeong <daehojeong@google.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH alternative 2] block: fix the REQ_OP_SECURE_ERASE handling to not leak erased data
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 10:11:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220318091152.GB31758@lst.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPDyKFrH4L2Y2TOFyWPJ+_rrgvJPixR05XX_HWUU99h0MZhLuA@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Mar 17, 2022 at 10:44:01AM +0100, Ulf Hansson wrote:
> Stating that it can't work is probably not a correct statement.
> Certainly it can, but it depends on how "secure" (or clever) the
> implementation of the FTL is in the flash media. I mean, nothing
> prevents the FTL from doing a real erase on erase block level and
> simply let the "secure erase" request wait on that operation to be
> completed.
Well, that assumes it can find all the previous copied of the data.
Having worked with various higher end SSDs FTLs I know they can't,
so if an eMMC device could that would very much surpise me given
the overhead.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-18 9:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-16 9:37 security issue: data exposure when using block layer secure erase Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-16 9:38 ` [PATCH, alternative 1] block: remove REQ_OP_SECURE_ERASE erase Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-16 9:38 ` [PATCH alternative 2] block: fix the REQ_OP_SECURE_ERASE handling to not leak erased data Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-17 9:44 ` Ulf Hansson
2022-03-18 9:11 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2022-03-18 10:36 ` Ulf Hansson
2022-03-16 18:05 ` security issue: data exposure when using block layer secure erase Eric Biggers
2022-03-17 9:57 ` Joel Granados
2022-03-18 9:10 ` Christoph Hellwig
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-03-18 22:31 [PATCH alternative 2] block: fix the REQ_OP_SECURE_ERASE handling to not leak erased data kernel test robot
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