From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from list by lists.gnu.org with archive (Exim 4.90_1) id 1nZSbh-0002Ui-By for mharc-grub-devel@gnu.org; Wed, 30 Mar 2022 03:19:05 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([209.51.188.92]:58076) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nZSbf-0002UW-Pi for grub-devel@gnu.org; Wed, 30 Mar 2022 03:19:03 -0400 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk ([176.126.240.207]:59480) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nZSbd-0005Pm-KT for grub-devel@gnu.org; Wed, 30 Mar 2022 03:19:03 -0400 Received: by cavan.codon.org.uk (Postfix, from userid 1000) id DC2BB40A71; Wed, 30 Mar 2022 08:18:59 +0100 (BST) Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 08:18:59 +0100 From: Matthew Garrett To: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Daniel Kiper , Alec Brown , Kanth Ghatraju , Ross Philipson , "dpsmith@apertussolutions.com" , "piotr.krol@3mdeb.com" , "krystian.hebel@3mdeb.com" , "persaur@gmail.com" , "Yoder, Stuart" , Andrew Cooper , "michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com" , James Bottomley , "lukasz@hawrylko.pl" , linux-efi , Linux Kernel Mailing List , The development of GNU GRUB , Kees Cook Subject: Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms Message-ID: <20220330071859.GA992@srcf.ucam.org> References: <20220329174057.GA17778@srcf.ucam.org> <20220330071103.GA809@srcf.ucam.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Received-SPF: pass client-ip=176.126.240.207; envelope-from=mjg59@codon.org.uk; helo=cavan.codon.org.uk X-Spam_score_int: -16 X-Spam_score: -1.7 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.7 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: grub-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: The development of GNU GRUB List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 07:19:04 -0000 On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 09:12:19AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Wed, 30 Mar 2022 at 09:11, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > The EFI stub carries out a bunch of actions that have meaningful > > security impact, and that's material that should be measured. Having the > > secure launch kernel execute the stub without awareness of what it does > > means it would need to measure the code without measuring the state, > > while the goal of DRTM solutions is to measure state rather than the > > code. > > But how is that any different from the early kernel code? >From a conceptual perspective we've thought of the EFI stub as being logically part of the bootloader rather than the early kernel, and the bootloader is a point where the line is drawn. My guy feeling is that jumping into the secure kernel environment before EBS has been called is likely to end badly.