From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
To: "Fabio M. De Francesco" <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Cc: Charlie Sands <sandsch@northvilleschools.net>,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net,
phil@philpotter.co.uk, linux-staging@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paskripkin@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] Fix unsafe memory access by memcmp
Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 17:35:31 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220404143531.GE3293@kadam> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1890716.PYKUYFuaPT@leap>
On Mon, Apr 04, 2022 at 04:29:48PM +0200, Fabio M. De Francesco wrote:
> On luned? 4 aprile 2022 14:03:32 CEST Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 04, 2022 at 01:25:37PM +0200, Fabio M. De Francesco wrote:
> > > On luned? 4 aprile 2022 12:50:41 CEST Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > > > On Sun, Apr 03, 2022 at 10:52:07PM -0400, Charlie Sands wrote:
> > > > > This patch fixes sparse warnings about the memcmp function unsafely
> > > > > accessing userspace memory without first copying it to kernel space.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Charlie Sands <sandsch@northvilleschools.net>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >
> > > > > V2: Fixed checkpatch.pl warning and changed variable name as suggested
> > > > > by Greg K. H. and improved error checking on the "copy_from_user" function as
> > > > > suggested by Pavel Skripkin.
> > > > >
> > > > > drivers/staging/r8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------
> > > > > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/staging/r8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/r8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
> > > > > index 7df213856d66..4b4eec2bde96 100644
> > > > > --- a/drivers/staging/r8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/staging/r8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
> > > > > @@ -3233,23 +3233,28 @@ static int rtw_p2p_get(struct net_device *dev,
> > > > > struct iw_request_info *info,
> > > > > union iwreq_data *wrqu, char *extra)
> > > > > {
> > > > > - if (!memcmp(wrqu->data.pointer, "status", 6)) {
> > > > > + char wrqu_data[9];
> > > > > +
> > > > > + if (copy_from_user(wrqu_data, wrqu->data.pointer, 9) != 0)
> > > > > + return 0;
> > > >
> > > > return -EFAULT; We can't assume that that user wants to copy 9 bytes
> > > > especially when they're passing a 4 character + NUL string.
> > > >
> > > > This is a custom ioctl. Called from ioctl_private_iw_point().
> > > >
> > > > I think if you try to dereference a user pointer like this then it will
> > > > cause a crash, right? So that means no one has ever tested or used this
> > > > code and we hopefully we can just delete it?
> > >
> > > After a quick look, I'm pretty confident that we can also delete
> > > rtw_p2p_get2() and rtw_p2p_set() unless I'm overlooking something.
> >
> > What are the problems with rtw_p2p_get2() and rtw_p2p_set()?
> >
> > regards,
> > dan carpenter
> >
> Is it safe to access user space pointers without using proper helpers?
No.
> In those cases I mean: is it safe without using copy_from_user()?
Correct. You need to use copy_from_user().
>
> As I said, perhaps I'm overlooking something. However my conclusions
> follow by your own argument.
>
> If I understand what you wrote, you asked to delete rtw_p2p_get()
> because it looks like nobody "has ever tested or used this code".
>
> rtw_p2p_get2() and rtw_p2p_set() use the same pattern of rtw_p2p_get()
> when they access user space without using the proper helpers.
Those functions use "extra" which is a kernel pointer. Which user
pointer do they use? Sparse doesn't detect it.
regards,
dan carpenter
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-04 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-04 2:52 [PATCH V2] Fix unsafe memory access by memcmp Charlie Sands
2022-04-04 8:02 ` Michael Straube
2022-04-04 10:50 ` Dan Carpenter
2022-04-04 11:25 ` Fabio M. De Francesco
2022-04-04 12:03 ` Dan Carpenter
2022-04-04 14:29 ` Fabio M. De Francesco
2022-04-04 14:35 ` Dan Carpenter [this message]
2022-04-04 14:47 ` Fabio M. De Francesco
2022-04-04 14:36 ` Greg KH
2022-04-04 16:33 ` Pavel Skripkin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220404143531.GE3293@kadam \
--to=dan.carpenter@oracle.com \
--cc=Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net \
--cc=fmdefrancesco@gmail.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-staging@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=paskripkin@gmail.com \
--cc=phil@philpotter.co.uk \
--cc=sandsch@northvilleschools.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.