From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A098C433EF for ; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:54:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235376AbiFWRyo (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:54:44 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41056 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235445AbiFWRwg (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:52:36 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2112563A7; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 10:13:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9D334B82498; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:13:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 00F7EC341CA; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:13:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1656004405; bh=b3tAOqFWHhp7uK8IscYVSpe8+FpMUzq1THBxCN2AgNA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Vl2k/0rDfkVBFgPGxvKKcWUbg4Hqq12znSnW4IX3Ngqje4IQWT2GQux7lAq+rTf10 GfCscAAKUfi4np6ku4c2VAh7VHomdaKPEr00zQM/hTjWhYSOEtG23Zv1Pp1yBw/2pS iQIZHwSl64DeV80Gyjw2e2aOpaNVVE0ZjVSD09Uc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Theodore Tso , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 4.19 027/234] random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:41:34 +0200 Message-Id: <20220623164343.833023360@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Andy Lutomirski commit c95ea0c69ffda19381c116db2be23c7e654dac98 upstream. It has no effect any more, so remove it. We can revert this if there is some user code that expects to be able to set this sysctl. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a74ed2cf0b5a5451428a246a9239f5bc4e29358f.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 18 +----------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -370,12 +370,6 @@ #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) /* - * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on - * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed. - */ -static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64; - -/* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write * access to /dev/random. @@ -2073,8 +2067,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user * #include -static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh; -static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; +static int min_write_thresh; static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; @@ -2150,15 +2143,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, }, { - .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold", - .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits, - .maxlen = sizeof(int), - .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &min_read_thresh, - .extra2 = &max_read_thresh, - }, - { .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int),