From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 105/264] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:41:38 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220623164347.041276828@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220623164344.053938039@linuxfoundation.org>
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
commit 6c0eace6e1499712583b6ee62d95161e8b3449f5 upstream.
This gets rid of another abstraction we no longer need. It would be nice
if we could instead make pool an array rather than a pointer, but the
latent entropy plugin won't be able to do its magic in that case. So
instead we put all accesses to the input pool's actual data through the
input_pool_data array directly.
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 217 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 101 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
*
* The primary kernel interface is
*
- * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+ * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
*
* This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
* and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a
@@ -132,10 +132,10 @@
*
* For less critical applications, there are the functions:
*
- * u32 get_random_u32()
- * u64 get_random_u64()
- * unsigned int get_random_int()
- * unsigned long get_random_long()
+ * u32 get_random_u32()
+ * u64 get_random_u64()
+ * unsigned int get_random_int()
+ * unsigned long get_random_long()
*
* These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes,
* and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended
@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@
* from the devices are:
*
* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
- * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
* unsigned int value);
* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
- * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
* void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
* size_t entropy);
* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@
* /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
* by using the commands:
*
- * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
- * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
+ * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
+ * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
*
* Acknowledgements:
* =================
@@ -444,9 +444,9 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list
static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
struct crng_state {
- u32 state[16];
- unsigned long init_time;
- spinlock_t lock;
+ u32 state[16];
+ unsigned long init_time;
+ spinlock_t lock;
};
static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = false
#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
+#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
@@ -497,17 +497,12 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
static struct {
- /* read-only data: */
- u32 *pool;
-
- /* read-write data: */
spinlock_t lock;
u16 add_ptr;
u16 input_rotate;
int entropy_count;
} input_pool = {
.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
- .pool = input_pool_data
};
static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min);
@@ -515,7 +510,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *bu
static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool);
-static u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+static const u32 twist_table[8] = {
0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
@@ -545,15 +540,15 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *
i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK;
/* XOR in the various taps */
- w ^= input_pool.pool[i];
- w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK];
- w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK];
- w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK];
- w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK];
- w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+ w ^= input_pool_data[i];
+ w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+ w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+ w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+ w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+ w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK];
/* Mix the result back in with a twist */
- input_pool.pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
+ input_pool_data[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
/*
* Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
@@ -585,10 +580,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i
}
struct fast_pool {
- u32 pool[4];
- unsigned long last;
- u16 reg_idx;
- u8 count;
+ u32 pool[4];
+ unsigned long last;
+ u16 reg_idx;
+ u8 count;
};
/*
@@ -716,7 +711,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int
return -EINVAL;
/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
- nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
+ nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
credit_entropy_bits(nbits);
return 0;
@@ -728,7 +723,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int
*
*********************************************************************/
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
@@ -751,9 +746,9 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_tr
static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
{
- int i;
- bool arch_init = true;
- unsigned long rv;
+ int i;
+ bool arch_init = true;
+ unsigned long rv;
for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
@@ -769,9 +764,9 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct cr
static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng)
{
- int i;
- bool arch_init = true;
- unsigned long rv;
+ int i;
+ bool arch_init = true;
+ unsigned long rv;
for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
@@ -841,7 +836,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct wor
struct crng_state *crng;
struct crng_state **pool;
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+ pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
for_each_online_node(i) {
crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
@@ -897,7 +892,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
return 0;
}
- p = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+ p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
@@ -978,12 +973,12 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(vo
*/
static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- static u8 lfsr = 1;
- u8 tmp;
- unsigned int i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
- const u8 * src_buf = cp;
- u8 * dest_buf = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+ unsigned long flags;
+ static u8 lfsr = 1;
+ u8 tmp;
+ unsigned int i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
+ const u8 *src_buf = cp;
+ u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
return 0;
@@ -994,7 +989,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,
if (len > max)
max = len;
- for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
tmp = lfsr;
lfsr >>= 1;
if (tmp & 1)
@@ -1009,11 +1004,11 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,
static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- int i, num;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int i, num;
union {
- u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
- u32 key[8];
+ u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u32 key[8];
} buf;
if (use_input_pool) {
@@ -1027,11 +1022,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- unsigned long rv;
+ unsigned long rv;
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
!arch_get_random_long(&rv))
rv = random_get_entropy();
- crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
+ crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
}
memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
@@ -1039,8 +1034,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
crng_finalize_init(crng);
}
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
- u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
{
unsigned long flags, init_time;
@@ -1069,9 +1063,9 @@ static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA20
static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- u32 *s, *d;
- int i;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 *s, *d;
+ int i;
used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32));
if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
@@ -1079,9 +1073,9 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru
used = 0;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- s = (u32 *) &tmp[used];
+ s = (u32 *)&tmp[used];
d = &crng->state[4];
- for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
*d++ ^= *s++;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
}
@@ -1126,7 +1120,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __
return ret;
}
-
/*********************************************************************
*
* Entropy input management
@@ -1221,11 +1214,11 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
* Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
* and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
*/
- credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
+ credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
}
void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- unsigned int value)
+ unsigned int value)
{
static unsigned char last_value;
@@ -1245,19 +1238,19 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool,
#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
-#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
+#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
+#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT - 1))
static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
{
- long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
+ long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
- /* Use a weighted moving average */
- delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_cycles += delta;
- /* And average deviation */
- delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_deviation += delta;
+ /* Use a weighted moving average */
+ delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+ avg_cycles += delta;
+ /* And average deviation */
+ delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+ avg_deviation += delta;
}
#else
#define add_interrupt_bench(x)
@@ -1265,7 +1258,7 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t
static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- u32 *ptr = (u32 *) regs;
+ u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs;
unsigned int idx;
if (regs == NULL)
@@ -1280,12 +1273,12 @@ static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f,
void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
{
- struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
- unsigned long now = jiffies;
- cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
- u32 c_high, j_high;
- u64 ip;
+ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+ unsigned long now = jiffies;
+ cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
+ u32 c_high, j_high;
+ u64 ip;
if (cycles == 0)
cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
@@ -1295,8 +1288,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
- fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
- get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
+ fast_pool->pool[3] ^=
+ (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
@@ -1310,8 +1303,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
return;
}
- if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
- !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
+ if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
return;
if (!spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock))
@@ -1375,7 +1367,7 @@ retry:
entropy_count = 0;
}
nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
- if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
+ if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac)
entropy_count -= nfrac;
else
entropy_count = 0;
@@ -1420,7 +1412,7 @@ static void extract_buf(u8 *out)
/* Generate a hash across the pool */
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
- blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool.pool, POOL_BYTES);
+ blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool_data, POOL_BYTES);
blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */
/*
@@ -1478,10 +1470,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf
}
#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
- _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
+ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
- void **previous)
+static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
const bool print_once = false;
@@ -1489,8 +1480,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
static bool print_once __read_mostly;
#endif
- if (print_once ||
- crng_ready() ||
+ if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
(previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
return;
WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
@@ -1542,7 +1532,6 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
-
/*
* Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
* jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
@@ -1581,7 +1570,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
__setup_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0, 0);
while (!crng_ready()) {
if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
- mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
+ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
schedule();
stack.now = random_get_entropy();
@@ -1791,9 +1780,8 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk
}
#endif
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
- loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret;
@@ -1803,8 +1791,8 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, c
return ret;
}
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+ loff_t *ppos)
{
static int maxwarn = 10;
@@ -1818,8 +1806,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __u
return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
}
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+ loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret;
@@ -1829,8 +1817,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __us
return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
}
-static unsigned int
-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+static unsigned int random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
unsigned int mask;
@@ -1844,8 +1831,7 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_tabl
return mask;
}
-static int
-write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
{
size_t bytes;
u32 t, buf[16];
@@ -1947,35 +1933,35 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct
}
const struct file_operations random_fops = {
- .read = random_read,
+ .read = random_read,
.write = random_write,
- .poll = random_poll,
+ .poll = random_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
};
const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
- .read = urandom_read,
+ .read = urandom_read,
.write = random_write,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
};
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
- unsigned int, flags)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
+ flags)
{
int ret;
- if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE))
+ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
* no sense.
*/
- if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM))
+ if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
return -EINVAL;
if (count > INT_MAX)
@@ -2123,7 +2109,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
#endif
{ }
};
-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
struct batched_entropy {
union {
@@ -2143,7 +2129,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
* point prior.
*/
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+ .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
};
u64 get_random_u64(void)
@@ -2168,7 +2154,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+ .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
};
u32 get_random_u32(void)
{
@@ -2200,7 +2186,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v
int cpu;
unsigned long flags;
- for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
@@ -2229,8 +2215,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v
* Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
* @start is returned.
*/
-unsigned long
-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
{
if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-23 17:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 271+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-23 16:39 [PATCH 4.9 000/264] 4.9.320-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 001/264] 9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Dont update file type when updating file attributes" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 002/264] random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 003/264] random: remove stale urandom_init_wait Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 004/264] random: remove variable limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 005/264] random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 006/264] random: convert get_random_int/long into get_random_u32/u64 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 007/264] random: move random_min_urandom_seed into CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 008/264] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 009/264] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 010/264] random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 011/264] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 012/264] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 013/264] random: do not ignore early device randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 014/264] random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 015/264] random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 016/264] random: fix warning message on ia64 and parisc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 017/264] random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 018/264] random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 019/264] random: fix possible sleeping allocation from irq context Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 020/264] random: rate limit unseeded randomness warnings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 021/264] random: add a spinlock_t to struct batched_entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 022/264] char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 023/264] Revert "char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 024/264] random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 025/264] random: fix data race on crng_node_pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 026/264] crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 027/264] random: always fill buffer in get_random_bytes_wait Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 028/264] random: optimize add_interrupt_randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 029/264] drivers/char/random.c: remove unused dont_count_entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 030/264] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 031/264] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 032/264] random: add a config option to trust the CPUs hwrng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 033/264] random: remove preempt disabled region Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 034/264] random: Make crng state queryable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 035/264] random: make CPU trust a boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 036/264] drivers/char/random.c: constify poolinfo_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 037/264] drivers/char/random.c: remove unused stuct poolinfo::poolbits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 038/264] drivers/char/random.c: make primary_crng static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 039/264] random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 040/264] random: move rand_initialize() earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 041/264] random: document get_random_int() family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 042/264] latent_entropy: avoid build error when plugin cflags are not set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 043/264] random: fix soft lockup when trying to read from an uninitialized blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 044/264] random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 045/264] fdt: add support for rng-seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 046/264] random: Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 047/264] char/random: Add a newline at the end of the file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 048/264] Revert "hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 049/264] crypto: Deduplicate le32_to_cpu_array() and cpu_to_le32_array() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 050/264] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 051/264] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 052/264] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 053/264] random: Dont wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 054/264] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that dont warn Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 055/264] random: add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 056/264] random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 057/264] random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 058/264] random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 059/264] random: remove the blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 060/264] random: delete code to pull data into pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 061/264] random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 062/264] random: remove unnecessary unlikely() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 063/264] random: convert to ENTROPY_BITS for better code readability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 064/264] random: Add and use pr_fmt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 065/264] random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 066/264] random: remove some dead code of poolinfo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 067/264] random: split primary/secondary crng init paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 068/264] random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 069/264] x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 070/264] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 071/264] linux/random.h: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 072/264] linux/random.h: Use false with bool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 073/264] linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 074/264] powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 075/264] random: add arch_get_random_*long_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 076/264] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 077/264] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 078/264] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 079/264] crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 080/264] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 081/264] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 082/264] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 083/264] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 084/264] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 085/264] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 086/264] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 087/264] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 088/264] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 089/264] random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 090/264] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 091/264] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 092/264] random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 093/264] random: fix typo in comments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 094/264] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 095/264] crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 096/264] random: cleanup integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 097/264] random: remove incomplete last_data logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 098/264] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 099/264] random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 100/264] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 101/264] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 102/264] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 103/264] random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 104/264] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 106/264] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 107/264] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 108/264] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 109/264] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 110/264] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 111/264] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 112/264] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 113/264] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 114/264] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 115/264] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 116/264] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 117/264] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 118/264] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 119/264] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 120/264] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 121/264] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 122/264] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 123/264] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 124/264] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 125/264] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 126/264] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 127/264] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 128/264] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 129/264] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 130/264] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 131/264] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 132/264] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 133/264] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 134/264] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 135/264] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 136/264] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 137/264] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 138/264] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 139/264] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 140/264] workqueue: make workqueue available early during boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 141/264] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 142/264] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 143/264] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 144/264] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 145/264] hwrng: core - do not use multiple blank lines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 146/264] hwrng: core - rewrite better comparison to NULL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 147/264] hwrng: core - Rewrite the header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 148/264] hwrng: core - Move hwrng miscdev minor number to include/linux/miscdevice.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 149/264] hwrng: core - remove unused PFX macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 150/264] hwrng: use rng source with best quality Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 151/264] hwrng: remember rng chosen by user Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 152/264] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 153/264] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 154/264] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 155/264] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 156/264] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 157/264] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 158/264] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 159/264] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 160/264] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 161/264] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 162/264] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 163/264] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 164/264] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 165/264] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 166/264] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 167/264] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 168/264] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 169/264] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 170/264] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 171/264] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 172/264] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 173/264] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 174/264] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 175/264] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 176/264] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 177/264] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 178/264] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 179/264] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 180/264] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 181/264] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 182/264] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 183/264] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 184/264] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 185/264] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 186/264] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 187/264] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 188/264] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 189/264] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 190/264] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 191/264] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 192/264] uapi: rename ext2_swab() to swab() and share globally in swab.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 193/264] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 194/264] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 195/264] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 196/264] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 197/264] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 198/264] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 199/264] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 200/264] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 201/264] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 202/264] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 203/264] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 204/264] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 205/264] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 206/264] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 207/264] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 208/264] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 209/264] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 210/264] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 211/264] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 212/264] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 213/264] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 214/264] Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 215/264] crypto: drbg - add FIPS 140-2 CTRNG for noise source Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 216/264] crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 217/264] crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 218/264] crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 219/264] crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 220/264] crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instance Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 221/264] crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 222/264] random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 223/264] random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 224/264] random: account for arch randomness in bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 225/264] ASoC: cs42l52: Fix TLV scales for mixer controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 226/264] ASoC: cs53l30: Correct number of volume levels on SX controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 227/264] ASoC: cs42l52: Correct TLV for Bypass Volume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 228/264] ASoC: cs42l56: Correct typo in minimum level for SX volume controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 229/264] ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 230/264] ASoC: wm8962: Fix suspend while playing music Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 231/264] scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 232/264] scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 233/264] virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 234/264] nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferred Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 235/264] ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 236/264] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface netdev[napi]_alloc_frag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 237/264] random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 238/264] pNFS: Dont keep retrying if the server replied NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 239/264] misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 240/264] irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 241/264] irqchip/gic-v3: Iterate over possible CPUs by for_each_possible_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 242/264] comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 243/264] USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 244/264] USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 245/264] usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 246/264] serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 247/264] ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 248/264] ext4: make variable "count" signed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 249/264] ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 250/264] l2tp: dont use inet_shutdown on ppp session destroy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 251/264] l2tp: fix race in pppol2tp_release with session object destroy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 252/264] s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 253/264] xprtrdma: fix incorrect header size calculations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 254/264] swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 255/264] Reinstate some of "swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE"" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 256/264] fuse: fix pipe buffer lifetime for direct_io Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 257/264] tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 258/264] tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 259/264] secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 260/264] tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 261/264] tcp: add small random increments to the source port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 262/264] tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 263/264] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 264/264] tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 19:30 ` [PATCH 4.9 000/264] 4.9.320-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-23 20:11 ` Pavel Machek
2022-06-24 0:54 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-24 9:29 ` Jon Hunter
2022-06-24 23:33 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-25 13:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
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