From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CEF0DC43334 for ; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:40:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234471AbiFWRkD (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:40:03 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42688 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234753AbiFWRiN (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:38:13 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA9D9B1FB; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 10:07:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8C4F1B82490; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:07:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DEDAFC3411B; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:07:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1656004076; bh=DPnFIHqCLWmJHrvmgIpzuKyLqE8UiAa+IVFBNmuOZEo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=KSgckr1ZIYlnTqdZ4ijaCmBKfeCf5IVEbGQ+pSZav4TIrTd1NDlNPxNI9Z8JHwF2S ZdrvQJD/WDYVV/Tc/CkEEPbzWelwCCvz+xGU/AYfeFMtAa+VaA0sHe3PQ2zYd2PjVC IvI1irXtuoqGEIC4Spe8sz5d8nEBxLaalOlhDu2w= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Dominik Brodowski , Theodore Tso , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 4.14 139/237] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:42:53 +0200 Message-Id: <20220623164347.152971040@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.132308638@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220623164343.132308638@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" commit 1754abb3e7583c570666fa1e1ee5b317e88c89a0 upstream. Prior, the "input_pool_data" array needed no real initialization, and so it was easy to mark it with __latent_entropy to populate it during compile-time. In switching to using a hash function, this required us to specifically initialize it to some specific state, which means we dropped the __latent_entropy attribute. An unfortunate side effect was this meant the pool was no longer seeded using compile-time random data. In order to bring this back, we declare an array in rand_initialize() with __latent_entropy and call mix_pool_bytes() on that at init, which accomplishes the same thing as before. We make this __initconst, so that it doesn't take up space at runtime after init. Fixes: 6e8ec2552c7d ("random: use computational hash for entropy extraction") Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -967,6 +967,11 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; +#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) + static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy; + _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed)); +#endif + for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {