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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 35/61] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 20:39:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220712183238.379472213@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220712183236.931648980@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 upstream.

Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called
entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are
named consistently.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/xen/setup.c   |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S |   20 ++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h |    6 +++---
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature))
 		return;
 
-	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target);
+	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat);
 	if(ret != 0)
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature);
 }
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target);
+	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret);
 		/* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other
@@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void)
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) {
 		ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32,
-					xen_syscall32_target);
+					xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
 	}
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_retu
  */
 
 /* Normal 64-bit system call target */
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
 	ENDBR
 	popq %rcx
@@ -249,12 +249,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target)
 	movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
 
 	jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
 
 /* 32-bit compat syscall target */
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
 	ENDBR
 	popq %rcx
@@ -269,10 +269,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target)
 	movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
 
 	jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
 
 /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
 	ENDBR
 	/*
@@ -291,19 +291,19 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target)
 	movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
 
 	jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
 
 #else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
 
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target)
-SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
 	ENDBR
 	lea 16(%rsp), %rsp	/* strip %rcx, %r11 */
 	mov $-ENOSYS, %rax
 	pushq $0
 	jmp hypercall_iret
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target)
-SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
 /* These are code, but not functions.  Defined in entry.S */
 extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[];
 
-void xen_sysenter_target(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-void xen_syscall_target(void);
-void xen_syscall32_target(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void);
 #endif
 
 extern void *xen_initial_gdt;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-07-12 19:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-12 18:38 [PATCH 5.18 00/61] 5.18.12-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/61] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/61] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/61] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/61] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/61] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/61] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/61] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/61] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/61] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/61] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/61] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 12/61] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 13/61] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 14/61] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 15/61] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 16/61] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 17/61] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 18/61] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 19/61] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 20/61] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 21/61] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 22/61] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 23/61] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 24/61] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 25/61] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 26/61] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 27/61] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 28/61] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 29/61] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 30/61] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 31/61] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 32/61] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 33/61] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 34/61] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13  7:45   ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13  7:54     ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13  8:17       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13  9:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-13  9:50           ` [PATCH] x86/asm/32: fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32bit Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 10:45     ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit tip-bot2 for Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 10:52     ` tip-bot2 for Jiri Slaby
2022-07-12 18:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 36/61] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 37/61] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 38/61] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 39/61] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 40/61] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 41/61] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 42/61] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 43/61] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 44/61] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 45/61] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 46/61] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 47/61] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 48/61] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 49/61] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 50/61] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 51/61] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 52/61] KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 53/61] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 54/61] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 55/61] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 56/61] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 57/61] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 58/61] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 59/61] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 60/61] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 61/61] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 23:52 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/61] 5.18.12-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-07-13  0:43 ` Zan Aziz
2022-07-13  3:16 ` Shuah Khan
2022-07-13  7:17 ` Jon Hunter
2022-07-13  8:30 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-13  9:34 ` Fenil Jain
2022-07-13 10:06 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2022-07-13 10:17 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-13 11:03 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-13 13:03   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13 13:58     ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-13 16:54       ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-07-13 14:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-13 22:18 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-13 22:21 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-07-15 11:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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