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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 32/78] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 20:39:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220712183240.095416713@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220712183238.844813653@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit ee88d363d15617ff50ac24fab0ffec11113b2aeb upstream.

In addition to teaching static_call about the new way to spell 'RET',
there is an added complication in that static_call() is allowed to
rewrite text before it is known which particular spelling is required.

In order to deal with this; have a static_call specific fixup in the
apply_return() 'alternative' patching routine that will rewrite the
static_call trampoline to match the definite sequence.

This in turn creates the problem of uniquely identifying static call
trampolines. Currently trampolines are 8 bytes, the first 5 being the
jmp.d32/ret sequence and the final 3 a byte sequence that spells out
'SCT'.

This sequence is used in __static_call_validate() to ensure it is
patching a trampoline and not a random other jmp.d32. That is,
false-positives shouldn't be plenty, but aren't a big concern.

OTOH the new __static_call_fixup() must not have false-positives, and
'SCT' decodes to the somewhat weird but semi plausible sequence:

  push %rbx
  rex.XB push %r12

Additionally, there are SLS concerns with immediate jumps. Combined it
seems like a good moment to change the signature to a single 3 byte
trap instruction that is unique to this usage and will not ever get
generated by accident.

As such, change the signature to: '0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc', which decodes
to:

  ud1 %esp, %ecx

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: skip validation as introduced by 2105a92748e8 ("static_call,x86: Robustify trampoline patching")]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h |   17 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c      |   12 +++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c      |   38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
@@ -21,6 +21,16 @@
  * relative displacement across sections.
  */
 
+/*
+ * The trampoline is 8 bytes and of the general form:
+ *
+ *   jmp.d32 \func
+ *   ud1 %esp, %ecx
+ *
+ * That trailing #UD provides both a speculation stop and serves as a unique
+ * 3 byte signature identifying static call trampolines. Also see tramp_ud[]
+ * and __static_call_fixup().
+ */
 #define __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, insns)			\
 	asm(".pushsection .static_call.text, \"ax\"		\n"	\
 	    ".align 4						\n"	\
@@ -34,8 +44,13 @@
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)")
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name)			\
+	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk")
+#else
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "ret; int3; nop; nop; nop")
+#endif
 
 
 #define ARCH_ADD_TRAMP_KEY(name)					\
@@ -44,4 +59,6 @@
 	    ".long " STATIC_CALL_KEY_STR(name) " - .		\n"	\
 	    ".popsection					\n")
 
+extern bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest);
+
 #endif /* _ASM_STATIC_CALL_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -538,18 +538,22 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
 	s32 *s;
 
 	for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
-		void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+		void *dest = NULL, *addr = (void *)s + *s;
 		struct insn insn;
 		int len, ret;
 		u8 bytes[16];
-		u8 op1;
+		u8 op;
 
 		ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr);
 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0))
 			continue;
 
-		op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE))
+		op = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
+		if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE)
+			dest = addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value;
+
+		if (__static_call_fixup(addr, op, dest) ||
+		    WARN_ON_ONCE(dest != &__x86_return_thunk))
 			continue;
 
 		DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS",
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ enum insn_type {
 };
 
 /*
+ * ud1 %esp, %ecx - a 3 byte #UD that is unique to trampolines, chosen such
+ * that there is no false-positive trampoline identification while also being a
+ * speculation stop.
+ */
+static const u8 tramp_ud[] = { 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc };
+
+/*
  * cs cs cs xorl %eax, %eax - a single 5 byte instruction that clears %[er]ax
  */
 static const u8 xor5rax[] = { 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x31, 0xc0 };
@@ -43,7 +50,10 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transfor
 		break;
 
 	case RET:
-		code = &retinsn;
+		if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
+			code = text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, insn, &__x86_return_thunk);
+		else
+			code = &retinsn;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -109,3 +119,29 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *si
 	mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+/*
+ * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines,
+ * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as
+ * having a return trampoline.
+ *
+ * The problem is that static_call() is available before determining
+ * X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK and, by implication, running alternatives.
+ *
+ * This means that __static_call_transform() above can have overwritten the
+ * return trampoline and we now need to fix things up to be consistent.
+ */
+bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest)
+{
+	if (memcmp(tramp+5, tramp_ud, 3)) {
+		/* Not a trampoline site, not our problem. */
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (op == RET_INSN_OPCODE || dest == &__x86_return_thunk)
+		__static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL);
+
+	return true;
+}
+#endif



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-07-12 19:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-12 18:38 [PATCH 5.15 00/78] 5.15.55-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/78] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/78] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/78] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/78] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/78] objtool: Classify symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/78] objtool: Explicitly avoid self modifying code in .altinstr_replacement Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/78] objtool: Shrink struct instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/78] objtool,x86: Replace alternatives with .retpoline_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/78] objtool: Introduce CFI hash Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/78] x86/retpoline: Remove unused replacement symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/78] x86/asm: Fix register order Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/78] x86/asm: Fixup odd GEN-for-each-reg.h usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/78] x86/retpoline: Move the retpoline thunk declarations to nospec-branch.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/78] x86/retpoline: Create a retpoline thunk array Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/78] x86/alternative: Implement .retpoline_sites support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/78] x86/alternative: Handle Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/78] x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/78] x86/alternative: Add debug prints to apply_retpolines() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/78] bpf,x86: Simplify computing label offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/78] bpf,x86: Respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/78] objtool: Default ignore INT3 for unreachable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/78] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/78] x86/realmode: build with -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/78] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/78] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/78] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/78] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/78] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/78] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/78] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/78] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/78] x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/78] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/78] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/78] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/78] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/78] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/78] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/78] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/78] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/78] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/78] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 44/78] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 45/78] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 46/78] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 47/78] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 48/78] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 49/78] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 50/78] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 51/78] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 52/78] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 53/78] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 54/78] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 55/78] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 56/78] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 57/78] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 58/78] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 59/78] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 60/78] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 61/78] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 62/78] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 63/78] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 64/78] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 65/78] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 66/78] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 67/78] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 68/78] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 69/78] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 70/78] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 71/78] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 72/78] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 73/78] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 74/78] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 75/78] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 76/78] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 77/78] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 78/78] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 23:25 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/78] 5.15.55-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-07-13  3:19 ` Shuah Khan
2022-07-13  3:25 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-13  7:17 ` Jon Hunter
2022-07-13 10:09 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2022-07-13 12:52 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-13 13:34   ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-13 18:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-13 18:40       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-14  9:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-14 13:46           ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-07-14 14:46             ` Boris Petkov
2022-07-14 17:02               ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-14 17:12                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-07-14 17:22                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-14 18:00                   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-14 18:16                     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-14 19:26                       ` Boris Petkov
2022-07-15 11:35                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-07-14 16:51           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-14 17:00             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-14 20:39               ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-15 14:03                 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-14  9:50   ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-14 10:04     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-14 10:59       ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-07-13 16:41 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-13 22:18 ` Guenter Roeck

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