[PATCH 05/10] rsync: Upgrade to 3.2.5

[Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>]

Changlog is here [1]
[1] https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/NEWS#3.2.5

Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch          | 372 ------------------
 .../rsync/{rsync_3.2.4.bb => rsync_3.2.5.bb}  |   4 +-
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 375 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/{rsync_3.2.4.bb => rsync_3.2.5.bb} (95%)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e43b092ea89..00000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2022-29154.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,372 +0,0 @@
-From b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
-Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 16:55:34 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Some extra file-list safety checks.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/commit/b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871]
-CVE: CVE-2022-29154
-Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
----
- exclude.c  | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- flist.c    |  17 ++++++-
- io.c       |   4 ++
- main.c     |   7 ++-
- receiver.c |  11 +++--
- rsync.1.md |  44 ++++++++++++++++--
- 6 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
---- a/exclude.c
-+++ b/exclude.c
-@@ -27,16 +27,22 @@ extern int am_server;
- extern int am_sender;
- extern int eol_nulls;
- extern int io_error;
-+extern int xfer_dirs;
-+extern int recurse;
- extern int local_server;
- extern int prune_empty_dirs;
- extern int ignore_perishable;
-+extern int old_style_args;
-+extern int relative_paths;
- extern int delete_mode;
- extern int delete_excluded;
- extern int cvs_exclude;
- extern int sanitize_paths;
- extern int protocol_version;
-+extern int list_only;
- extern int module_id;
- 
-+extern char *filesfrom_host;
- extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
- extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
- extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
-@@ -44,8 +50,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
- filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" };
- filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" };
- filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
-+filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
- 
- int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
-+int trust_sender_filter = 0;
- 
- /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
- #define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16)
-@@ -292,6 +300,125 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *l
- 	}
- }
- 
-+/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include
-+ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */
-+void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
-+{
-+	filter_rule *rule;
-+	int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0;
-+	int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */
-+	const char *cp;
-+	char *p;
-+	if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
-+		return;
-+	if (relative_paths) {
-+		cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
-+		if (cp)
-+			arg = cp+3;
-+	} else {
-+		if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
-+			arg = cp + 1;
-+	}
-+	arg_len = strlen(arg);
-+	if (arg_len) {
-+		if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
-+			/* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */
-+			cp = arg;
-+			while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) {
-+				arg_len++;
-+				cp++;
-+			}
-+			saw_wild = 1;
-+		}
-+		arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */
-+		rule = new0(filter_rule);
-+		if (!implied_filter_list.head)
-+			implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule;
-+		else {
-+			rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
-+			implied_filter_list.head = rule;
-+		}
-+		rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
-+		p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1);
-+		*p++ = '/';
-+		cp = arg;
-+		while (*cp) {
-+			switch (*cp) {
-+			  case '\\':
-+				backslash_cnt++;
-+				if (saw_wild)
-+					*p++ = '\\';
-+				*p++ = *cp++;
-+				break;
-+			  case '/':
-+				if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
-+					break;
-+				if (relative_paths) {
-+					filter_rule const *ent;
-+					int found = 0;
-+					*p = '\0';
-+					for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
-+						if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0)
-+							found = 1;
-+					}
-+					if (!found) {
-+						filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
-+						R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
-+						R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
-+						R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
-+						R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
-+						implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
-+					}
-+				}
-+				slash_cnt++;
-+				*p++ = *cp++;
-+				break;
-+			  default:
-+				*p++ = *cp++;
-+				break;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		*p = '\0';
-+		rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
-+		arg = (const char *)rule->pattern;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
-+		/* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */
-+		rule = new0(filter_rule);
-+		if (recurse)
-+			rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2;
-+		else
-+			rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD;
-+		/* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */
-+		if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) {
-+			/* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */
-+			p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1);
-+			cp = arg;
-+			while (*cp) {
-+				if (*cp == '\\')
-+					*p++ = '\\';
-+				*p++ = *cp++;
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1);
-+			if (arg_len) {
-+				memcpy(p, arg, arg_len);
-+				p += arg_len;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if (p[-1] != '/')
-+			*p++ = '/';
-+		*p++ = '*';
-+		if (recurse)
-+			*p++ = '*';
-+		*p = '\0';
-+		rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
-+		rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
-+		implied_filter_list.head = rule;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- /* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */
- static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp)
- {
-@@ -718,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum lo
- 			      : name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory"
- 			      : "file";
- 		rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n",
--		    w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
-+		    w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
- 		    t, name, ent->pattern,
- 		    ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type);
- 	}
-@@ -890,6 +1017,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const
- 		}
- 		switch (ch) {
- 		case ':':
-+			trust_sender_filter = 1;
- 			rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE
- 				      | FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP;
- 			/* FALL THROUGH */
---- a/flist.c
-+++ b/flist.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist;
- extern int sender_symlink_iconv;
- extern int output_needs_newline;
- extern int sender_keeps_checksum;
-+extern int trust_sender_filter;
- extern int unsort_ndx;
- extern uid_t our_uid;
- extern struct stats stats;
-@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
- 
- extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
- 
--extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
--extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
-+extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list;
- 
- #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
- extern int filesfrom_convert;
-@@ -986,6 +986,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_ent
- 		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
-+		int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
-+		if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
-+		 && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
-+			rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
-+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+		}
-+		if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
-+			rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
-+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) {
- 		if (one_file_system) {
- 			/* Room to save the dir's device for -x */
---- a/io.c
-+++ b/io.c
-@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
- 		while (s != eob) {
- 			if (*s++ == '\0') {
- 				ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1;
-+				add_implied_include(sob);
- 				if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0)
- 					exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */
- 				write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */
-@@ -450,9 +451,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
- 		char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos;
- 		char *t = ff_xb.buf;
- 		char *eob = f + len;
-+		char *cur = t;
- 		/* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */
- 		while (f != eob) {
- 			if (!(*t++ = *f++)) {
-+				add_implied_include(cur);
-+				cur = t;
- 				while (f != eob && *f == '\0')
- 					f++;
- 			}
---- a/main.c
-+++ b/main.c
-@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern int backup_dir_len;
- extern int basis_dir_cnt;
- extern int default_af_hint;
- extern int stdout_format_has_i;
-+extern int trust_sender_filter;
- extern struct stats stats;
- extern char *stdout_format;
- extern char *logfile_format;
-@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
- extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
- extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1];
- extern struct file_list *first_flist;
--extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
-+extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list;
- 
- uid_t our_uid;
- gid_t our_gid;
-@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *mac
- #ifdef ICONV_CONST
- 		setup_iconv();
- #endif
-+		trust_sender_filter = 1;
- 	} else if (local_server) {
- 		/* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force
- 		 * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */
-@@ -1500,6 +1502,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
- 		char *dummy_host;
- 		int dummy_port = rsync_port;
- 		int i;
-+		if (filesfrom_fd < 0)
-+			add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]);
- 		/* For remote source, any extra source args must have either
- 		 * the same hostname or an empty hostname. */
- 		for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) {
-@@ -1523,6 +1527,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
- 			if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
- 				arg = ".";
- 			remote_argv[i] = arg;
-+			add_implied_include(arg);
- 		}
- 	}
- 
---- a/receiver.c
-+++ b/receiver.c
-@@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
- 		if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
- 			rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
- 
--		if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')
--		 && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
--			rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
--			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+		if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) {
-+			int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
-+			if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) {
-+				rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n",
-+					fname);
-+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+			}
- 		}
- 
- #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
---- a/rsync.1.md
-+++ b/rsync.1.md
-@@ -154,6 +154,33 @@ rsync daemon by leaving off the module n
- 
- See the following section for more details.
- 
-+## MULTI-HOST SECURITY
-+
-+Rsync takes steps to ensure that the file requests that are shared in a
-+transfer are protected against various security issues.  Most of the potential
-+problems arise on the receiving side where rsync takes steps to ensure that the
-+list of files being transferred remains within the bounds of what was
-+requested.
-+
-+Toward this end, rsync 3.1.2 and later have aborted when a file list contains
-+an absolute or relative path that tries to escape out of the top of the
-+transfer.  Also, beginning with version 3.2.5, rsync does two more safety
-+checks of the file list to (1) ensure that no extra source arguments were added
-+into the transfer other than those that the client requested and (2) ensure
-+that the file list obeys the exclude rules that we sent to the sender.
-+
-+For those that don't yet have a 3.2.5 client rsync, it is safest to do a copy
-+into a dedicated destination directory for the remote files rather than
-+requesting the remote content get mixed in with other local content.  For
-+example, doing an rsync copy into your home directory is potentially unsafe on
-+an older rsync if the remote rsync is being controlled by a bad actor:
-+
-+>     rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~
-+
-+A safer command would be:
-+
-+>     rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~/host1-files
-+
- ## ADVANCED USAGE
- 
- The syntax for requesting multiple files from a remote host is done by
-@@ -2323,6 +2350,12 @@ your home directory (remove the '=' for
-     behavior.  The environment is always overridden by manually specified
-     positive or negative options (the negative is `--no-old-args`).
- 
-+    Note that this option also disables the extra safety check added in 3.2.5
-+    that ensures that a remote sender isn't including extra top-level items in
-+    the file-list that you didn't request.  This side-effect is necessary
-+    because we can't know for sure what names to expect when the remote shell
-+    is interpreting the args.
-+
-     This option conflicts with the [`--protect-args`](#opt) option.
- 
- 0.  `--protect-args`, `-s`
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.5.bb
similarity index 95%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.5.bb
index 711e97002d2..a1ba5ea44d1 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.5.bb
@@ -14,10 +14,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://rsyncd.conf \
            file://makefile-no-rebuild.patch \
            file://determism.patch \
-           file://CVE-2022-29154.patch \
            "
-
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6f761838d08052b0b6579cf7f6737d93e47f01f4da04c5d24d3447b7f2a5fad1"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2ac4d21635cdf791867bc377c35ca6dda7f50d919a58be45057fd51600c69aba"
 
 # -16548 required for v3.1.3pre1. Already in v3.1.3.
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += " CVE-2017-16548 "
-- 
2.37.2