[PATCH 4/6] acl: move idmapping handling into posix_acl_xattr_set()

[Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>]

The uapi POSIX ACL struct passed through the value argument during
setxattr() contains {g,u}id values encoded via ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries
that should actually be stored in the form of k{g,u}id_t (See [1] for a
long explanation of the issue.).

In 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()")
we took the mount's idmapping into account in order to let overlayfs
handle POSIX ACLs on idmapped layers correctly. The fixup is currently
performed directly in vfs_setxattr() which piles on top of the earlier
hackiness by handling the mount's idmapping and stuff the vfs{g,u}id_t
values into the uapi struct as well. While that is all correct and works
fine it's just ugly.

Now that we have introduced vfs_make_posix_acl() earlier move handling
idmapped mounts out of vfs_setxattr() and into the POSIX ACL handler
where it belongs.

Note that we also need to call vfs_make_posix_acl() for EVM which
interpretes POSIX ACLs during security_inode_setxattr(). Leave them a
longer comment for future reference.

All filesystems that support idmapped mounts via FS_ALLOW_IDMAP use the
standard POSIX ACL xattr handlers and are covered by this change. This
includes overlayfs which simply calls vfs_{g,s}etxattr().

The following filesystems use custom POSIX ACL xattr handlers: 9p, cifs,
ecryptfs, and ntfs3 (and overlayfs but we've covered that in the paragraph
above) and none of them support idmapped mounts yet.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
---
 fs/posix_acl.c                    | 52 +++++++------------------------
 fs/xattr.c                        |  3 --
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 17 ++++++++--
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 31eac28e6582..c759b8eef62e 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -771,46 +771,6 @@ void posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	}
 }
 
-void posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
-				     const struct inode *inode,
-				     void *value, size_t size)
-{
-	struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;
-	struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (void *)(header + 1), *end;
-	struct user_namespace *fs_userns = i_user_ns(inode);
-	int count;
-	vfsuid_t vfsuid;
-	vfsgid_t vfsgid;
-	kuid_t uid;
-	kgid_t gid;
-
-	if (no_idmapping(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode)))
-		return;
-
-	count = posix_acl_fix_xattr_common(value, size);
-	if (count <= 0)
-		return;
-
-	for (end = entry + count; entry != end; entry++) {
-		switch (le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag)) {
-		case ACL_USER:
-			uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
-			vfsuid = VFSUIDT_INIT(uid);
-			uid = from_vfsuid(mnt_userns, fs_userns, vfsuid);
-			entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid));
-			break;
-		case ACL_GROUP:
-			gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
-			vfsgid = VFSGIDT_INIT(gid);
-			gid = from_vfsgid(mnt_userns, fs_userns, vfsgid);
-			entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid));
-			break;
-		default:
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 static void posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(
 	struct user_namespace *to, struct user_namespace *from,
 	void *value, size_t size)
@@ -1211,7 +1171,17 @@ posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	int ret;
 
 	if (value) {
-		acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
+		/*
+		 * By the time we end up here the {g,u}ids stored in
+		 * ACL_{GROUP,USER} have already been mapped according to the
+		 * caller's idmapping. The vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper will
+		 * recover them and take idmapped mounts into account. The
+		 * filesystem will receive the POSIX ACLs in in the correct
+		 * format ready to be cached or written to the backing store
+		 * taking the filesystem idmapping into account.
+		 */
+		acl = vfs_set_acl_prepare(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode),
+					  value, size);
 		if (IS_ERR(acl))
 			return PTR_ERR(acl);
 	}
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index a1f4998bc6be..3ac68ec0c023 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -305,9 +305,6 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
 		size = error;
 	}
 
-	if (size && is_posix_acl_xattr(name))
-		posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(mnt_userns, inode, value, size);
-
 retry_deleg:
 	inode_lock(inode);
 	error = __vfs_setxattr_locked(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size,
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 2e6fb6e2ffd2..23d484e05e6f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -457,10 +457,21 @@ static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	int rc;
 
 	/*
-	 * user_ns is not relevant here, ACL_USER/ACL_GROUP don't have impact
-	 * on the inode mode (see posix_acl_equiv_mode()).
+	 * An earlier comment here mentioned that the idmappings for
+	 * ACL_{GROUP,USER} don't matter since EVM is only interested in the
+	 * mode stored as part of POSIX ACLs. Nonetheless, if it must translate
+	 * from the uapi POSIX ACL representation to the VFS internal POSIX ACL
+	 * representation it should do so correctly. There's no guarantee that
+	 * we won't change POSIX ACLs in a way that ACL_{GROUP,USER} matters
+	 * for the mode at some point and it's difficult to keep track of all
+	 * the LSM and integrity modules and what they do to POSIX ACLs.
+	 *
+	 * Frankly, EVM shouldn't try to interpret the uapi struct for POSIX
+	 * ACLs it received. It requires knowledge that only the VFS is
+	 * guaranteed to have.
 	 */
-	acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+	acl = vfs_set_acl_prepare(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode),
+				  xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl))
 		return 1;
 
-- 
2.34.1