From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 4/9] landlock: Support file truncation
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 17:49:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221001154908.49665-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221001154908.49665-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.
This flag hooks into the path_truncate LSM hook and covers file
truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as
well as creat().
This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates
corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document
the flag.
The following operations are restricted:
open(): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets
implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC).
Notable special cases:
* open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux
* open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it
creates a new file.
truncate() (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
right.
ftruncate() (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right
when it was previously opened.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +++-
security/landlock/fs.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++--
security/landlock/fs.h | 24 +++++
security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 1 +
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 7 +-
8 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 23df4e0e8ace..d830cdfdbe56 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -95,8 +95,19 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
* A file can only receive these access rights:
*
* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file.
- * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that
+ * you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in
+ * order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or
+ * :manpage:`creat(2)`.
* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`,
+ * :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with
+ * `O_TRUNC`. Whether an opened file can be truncated with
+ * :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the
+ * same way as read and write permissions are checked during
+ * :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and
+ * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the
+ * third version of the Landlock ABI.
*
* A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The
* following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
@@ -139,10 +150,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
*
* It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions
* accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
- * :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`,
- * :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`,
- * :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`,
- * :manpage:`access(2)`.
+ * :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`,
+ * :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`,
+ * :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`.
* Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
*/
/* clang-format off */
@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)
/* clang-format on */
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 083dd3d359de..80d507ce2305 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
/* clang-format on */
/*
@@ -297,6 +298,18 @@ get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
return access_dom & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
}
+/*
+ * init_layer_masks - Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in
+ * @access_request, the bits for all the layers are set where this access right
+ * is handled.
+ *
+ * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
+ * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
+ * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
+ *
+ * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
+ * in any of the active layers in @domain.
+ */
static inline access_mask_t
init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
const access_mask_t access_request,
@@ -1141,9 +1154,19 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
}
+static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
+{
+ return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+}
+
/* File hooks */
-static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
+/*
+ * get_required_file_open_access - Returns the access rights that are required
+ * for opening the file, depending on the file type and open mode.
+ */
+static inline access_mask_t
+get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
{
access_mask_t access = 0;
@@ -1163,17 +1186,82 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
{
+ layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
+ access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
+ const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
landlock_get_current_domain();
- if (!dom)
+ if (!dom) {
+ /*
+ * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not
+ * checked later on. It is more consistent.
+ */
+ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
return 0;
+ }
+
/*
- * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
- * return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock
+ * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access()
+ * may return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock
* evolution.
*/
- return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
+ open_access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file);
+
+ /*
+ * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
+ * that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
+ */
+ full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
+
+ allowed_access = full_access_request;
+ if (!is_access_to_paths_allowed(
+ dom, &file->f_path,
+ init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request, &layer_masks),
+ &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+ unsigned long access_bit;
+ unsigned long access_req = full_access_request;
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the actual allowed access rights from layer_masks.
+ * Remove each access right from allowed_access which has been
+ * vetoed by any layer.
+ */
+ for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)) {
+ if (layer_masks[access_bit])
+ allowed_access &= ~BIT_ULL(access_bit);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (open_access_request & ~allowed_access)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /*
+ * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the
+ * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the
+ * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of
+ * file access rights in the opened struct file.
+ */
+ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
+{
+ /*
+ * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
+ * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
+ * and execute operations.
+ *
+ * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock rights, we enforce
+ * them independently of whether the current thread is in a Landlock
+ * domain, so that open files passed between independent processes
+ * retain their behaviour.
+ */
+ if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
}
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1193,6 +1281,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
};
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index 8db7acf9109b..488e4813680a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -36,6 +36,24 @@ struct landlock_inode_security {
struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
};
+/**
+ * struct landlock_file_security - File security blob
+ *
+ * This information is populated when opening a file in hook_file_open, and
+ * tracks the relevant Landlock access rights that were available at the time
+ * of opening the file. Other LSM hooks use these rights in order to authorize
+ * operations on already opened files.
+ */
+struct landlock_file_security {
+ /**
+ * @allowed_access: Access rights that were available at the time of
+ * opening the file. This is not necessarily the full set of access
+ * rights available at that time, but it's the necessary subset as
+ * needed to authorize later operations on the open file.
+ */
+ access_mask_t allowed_access;
+};
+
/**
* struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
*
@@ -50,6 +68,12 @@ struct landlock_superblock_security {
atomic_long_t inode_refs;
};
+static inline struct landlock_file_security *
+landlock_file(const struct file *const file)
+{
+ return file->f_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
static inline struct landlock_inode_security *
landlock_inode(const struct inode *const inode)
{
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index b54184ab9439..82288f0e9e5e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..3f196d2ce4f9 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
};
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 735a0865ea11..f4d6fc7ed17f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
.write = fop_dummy_write,
};
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
/**
* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index da9290817866..72cdae277b02 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
- ASSERT_EQ(2, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+ ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 45de42a027c5..87b28d14a1aa 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -406,9 +406,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
ACCESS_FILE | \
@@ -422,7 +423,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
- ACCESS_LAST)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
/* clang-format on */
--
2.37.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-01 15:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-01 15:48 [PATCH v8 0/9] landlock: truncate support Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 1/9] security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 7:45 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-06 1:10 ` Paul Moore
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 2/9] selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 7:47 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 3/9] landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed() Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 7:54 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2022-10-04 19:56 ` [PATCH v8 4/9] landlock: Support file truncation Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-05 18:52 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-06 20:19 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:08 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 5/9] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 6/9] selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 7/9] selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from a Landlock-restricted to an unrestricted process Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:25 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 8/9] samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:47 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-01 15:49 ` [PATCH v8 9/9] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support Günther Noack
2022-10-05 18:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 8:49 ` Günther Noack
2022-10-05 19:18 ` [PATCH v8 0/9] landlock: truncate support Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-08 10:20 ` Günther Noack
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