From: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <surajjs@amazon.com>, <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@suse.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<jpoimboe@kernel.org>, <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
<pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>, <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
<stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Mitigate eIBRS PBRSB predictions with WRMSR
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 15:02:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221005220227.1959-1-surajjs@amazon.com> (raw)
tl;dr: The existing mitigation for eIBRS PBRSB predictions uses an INT3 to
ensure a call instruction retires before a following unbalanced RET. Replace
this with a WRMSR serialising instruction which has a lower performance
penalty.
== Background ==
eIBRS (enhanced indirect branch restricted speculation) is used to prevent
predictor addresses from one privilege domain from being used for prediction
in a higher privilege domain.
== Problem ==
On processors with eIBRS protections there can be a case where upon VM exit
a guest address may be used as an RSB prediction for an unbalanced RET if a
CALL instruction hasn't yet been retired. This is termed PBRSB (Post-Barrier
Return Stack Buffer).
A mitigation for this was introduced in:
(2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections)
This mitigation [1] has a ~1% performance impact on VM exit compared to without
it [2].
== Solution ==
The WRMSR instruction can be used as a speculation barrier and a serialising
instruction. Use this on the VM exit path instead to ensure that a CALL
instruction (in this case the call to vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host) has retired
before the prediction of a following unbalanced RET.
This mitigation [3] has a negligible performance impact.
== Testing ==
Run the outl_to_kernel kvm-unit-tests test 200 times per configuration which
counts the cycles for an exit to kernel mode.
[1] With existing mitigation:
Average: 2026 cycles
[2] With no mitigation:
Average: 2008 cycles
[3] With proposed mitigation:
Average: 2008 cycles
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 7 +++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 3 +--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index c936ce9f0c47..e5723e024b47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -159,10 +159,9 @@
* A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
* monstrosity above, manually.
*/
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2=ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS)
- ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
- __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr, \
- __stringify(__FILL_ONE_RETURN), \ftr2
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
.endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 6de96b943804..eb82797bd7bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -231,8 +231,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
* single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET.
*/
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
- X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index c9b49a09e6b5..fdcd8e10c2ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7049,8 +7049,13 @@ void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
* For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
* transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
* whether the guest/host values differ.
+ *
+ * For eIBRS affected by Post Barrier RSB Predictions a serialising
+ * instruction (wrmsr) must be executed to ensure a call instruction has
+ * retired before the prediction of a following unbalanced ret.
*/
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
+ cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) ||
vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
--
2.17.1
next reply other threads:[~2022-10-05 22:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-05 22:02 Suraj Jitindar Singh [this message]
2022-10-05 22:29 ` [PATCH] x86/speculation: Mitigate eIBRS PBRSB predictions with WRMSR Jim Mattson
2022-10-06 8:25 ` David Laight
2022-10-06 20:27 ` pawan.kumar.gupta
2022-10-05 23:24 ` Jim Mattson
2022-10-05 23:45 ` Pawan Gupta
2022-10-05 23:46 ` Jim Mattson
2022-10-06 0:26 ` Daniel Sneddon
2022-10-06 1:28 ` Jim Mattson
2022-10-06 8:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-06 2:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-07 1:44 ` pawan.kumar.gupta
2022-10-07 1:54 ` Pawan Gupta
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