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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 19/34] x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 08:02:52 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221031070140.564831853@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221031070140.108124105@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

commit ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 upstream.

RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of
conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively
execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't
completed yet.

  #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)       \
          mov     $(nr/2), reg;                   \
  771:                                            \
          ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;           \
          call    772f;                           \
  773:    /* speculation trap */                  \
          UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;                      \
          pause;                                  \
          lfence;                                 \
          jmp     773b;                           \
  772:                                            \
          ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;           \
          call    774f;                           \
  775:    /* speculation trap */                  \
          UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;                      \
          pause;                                  \
          lfence;                                 \
          jmp     775b;                           \
  774:                                            \
          add     $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp;     \
          dec     reg;                            \
          jnz     771b;        <----- CPU can miss-predict here.

Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro
can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based
attacks.

Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent
speculation while RSB is being filled.

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -54,7 +54,9 @@
 774:						\
 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp;	\
 	dec	reg;				\
-	jnz	771b;
+	jnz	771b;				\
+	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */	\
+	lfence;
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-10-31  7:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-31  7:02 [PATCH 4.14 00/34] 4.14.297-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/34] Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/34] x86/cpufeature: Add facility to check for min microcode revisions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/34] x86/cpufeature: Fix various quality problems in the <asm/cpu_device_hd.h> header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/34] x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/34] x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/34] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/34] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/34] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/34] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/34] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/34] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/34] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/34] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/34] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/34] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/34] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/34] entel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/34] x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/34] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/34] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/34] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/34] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/34] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/34] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/34] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/34] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/34] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/34] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/34] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/34] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/34] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/34] x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:03 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/34] x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31 11:05 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/34] 4.14.297-rc1 review Jon Hunter
2022-11-01  8:07 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-11-01 12:51 ` Guenter Roeck
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-10-27 20:48 [PATCH 4.14 00/34] Retbleed & PBRSB Mitigations Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/34] entel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 19/34] x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence Suraj Jitindar Singh

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