From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Subject: [PATCH v3] hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy
Date: Sun, 6 Nov 2022 16:02:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221106150243.150437-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y2fJy1akGIdQdH95@zx2c4.com>
Rather than calling add_device_randomness(), the add_early_randomness()
function should use add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that the early
entropy can be potentially credited, which allows for the RNG to
initialize earlier without having to wait for the kthread to come up.
This requires some minor API refactoring, by adding a `sleep_after`
parameter to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that we don't hit a
blocking sleep from add_early_randomness().
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
Herbert - it might be easiest for me to take this patch if you want? Or
if this will interfere with what you have going on, you can take it. Let
me know what you feel like. -Jason
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 8 +++++---
drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++------
include/linux/random.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index cc002b0c2f0c..63a0a8e4505d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -69,8 +69,10 @@ static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf, 32, 0);
mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
- if (bytes_read > 0)
- add_device_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read);
+ if (bytes_read > 0) {
+ size_t entropy = bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024;
+ add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read, entropy, false);
+ }
}
static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
@@ -528,7 +530,7 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
/* Outside lock, sure, but y'know: randomness. */
add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_fillbuf, rc,
- entropy >> 10);
+ entropy >> 10, true);
}
hwrng_fill = NULL;
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 4591d55cb135..70ecfcfdb1d7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
* the above entropy accumulation routines:
*
* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
- * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after);
* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
* void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len);
* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
@@ -891,11 +891,11 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
/*
- * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
- * when our pool is full.
+ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. Those devices
+ * may produce endless random bits, so this function will sleep for
+ * some amount of time after, if the sleep_after parameter is true.
*/
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after)
{
mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
credit_init_bits(entropy);
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
* Throttle writing to once every reseed interval, unless we're not yet
* initialized or no entropy is credited.
*/
- if (!kthread_should_stop() && (crng_ready() || !entropy))
+ if (!kthread_should_stop() && (crng_ready() || !entropy) && sleep_after)
schedule_timeout_interruptible(crng_reseed_interval());
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 2bdd3add3400..728b29ade208 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after);
#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
--
2.38.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-06 15:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-05 20:44 [PATCH] hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-06 1:31 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-06 1:50 ` [PATCH v2] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-06 7:02 ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-11-06 14:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-06 15:02 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-11-07 2:17 ` [PATCH v3] " Herbert Xu
2022-11-07 12:55 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-08 9:58 ` Herbert Xu
2022-11-07 7:39 ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-11-08 10:53 ` AngeloGioacchino Del Regno
2022-11-08 11:00 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-08 11:24 ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-08 11:44 ` AngeloGioacchino Del Regno
2022-11-08 22:05 ` Marek Szyprowski
2022-11-13 13:48 ` [PATCH v3] " kernel test robot
2022-11-13 14:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-07 7:37 ` [PATCH v2] " Dominik Brodowski
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