From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: jeffxu@chromium.org
Cc: skhan@linuxfoundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com, dverkamp@chromium.org,
hughd@google.com, jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, jannh@google.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC
Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2022 08:16:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202212080814.821C05264@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221207154939.2532830-2-jeffxu@google.com>
On Wed, Dec 07, 2022 at 03:49:34PM +0000, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> From: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
>
> The new F_SEAL_EXEC flag will prevent modification of the exec bits:
> written as traditional octal mask, 0111, or as named flags, S_IXUSR |
> S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH. Any chmod(2) or similar call that attempts to modify
> any of these bits after the seal is applied will fail with errno EPERM.
>
> This will preserve the execute bits as they are at the time of sealing,
> so the memfd will become either permanently executable or permanently
> un-executable.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
> Co-developed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
It looks like my Reviewed-by: tag was dropped?
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202212021443.0F684E33@keescook/
This patch is unchanged, so please carry forward any review/ack/tested
tags, etc.
But for the bots:
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-08 16:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-07 15:49 [PATCH v6 0/6] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-07 15:49 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-08 16:16 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-12-07 15:49 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-08 16:21 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 15:49 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-08 16:27 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-08 22:55 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-16 15:46 ` Peter Xu
2022-12-16 17:15 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-16 17:42 ` Andrew Morton
2022-12-16 18:11 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-16 20:35 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-16 21:46 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-16 22:06 ` Andrew Morton
2022-12-16 23:40 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-20 16:55 ` Shuah Khan
2022-12-23 18:06 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-07 15:49 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd jeffxu
2022-12-08 16:27 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 15:49 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-08 16:30 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 15:49 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create jeffxu
2022-12-08 16:32 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-08 16:46 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-08 16:13 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC Kees Cook
2022-12-08 18:33 ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-08 20:55 ` Kees Cook
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