From: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
To: sdf@google.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
john.fastabend@gmail.com, andrii@kernel.org,
martin.lau@linux.dev,
syzbot+b1e1f7feb407b56d0355@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, v4bel@theori.io
Subject: Re: [report] OOB in bpf_load_prog() flow
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 03:37:18 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221220113718.GA1109523@ubuntu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y6C1SFEj9MOOnAnb@google.com>
On Mon, Dec 19, 2022 at 11:02:32AM -0800, sdf@google.com wrote:
> On 12/19, Hyunwoo Kim wrote:
> > Dear,
>
> > This slab-out-of-bounds occurs in the bpf_prog_load() flow:
> > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashLog&x=172e2510480000
>
> > I was able to trigger KASAN using this syz reproduce code:
> > ```
> > #define _GNU_SOURCE
>
> > #include <endian.h>
> > #include <stdint.h>
> > #include <stdio.h>
> > #include <stdlib.h>
> > #include <string.h>
> > #include <sys/syscall.h>
> > #include <sys/types.h>
> > #include <unistd.h>
>
> > #ifndef __NR_bpf
> > #define __NR_bpf 321
> > #endif
> > #ifndef __NR_sched_setattr
> > #define __NR_sched_setattr 314
> > #endif
>
> > uint64_t r[4] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff,
> > 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};
>
> > int main(void)
> > {
> > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
> > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
> > syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
> > intptr_t res = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000080 = 0;
> > syscall(__NR_sched_setscheduler, 0, 2ul, 0x20000080ul);
> > *(uint64_t*)0x200000c0 = 5;
> > syscall(__NR_sched_setaffinity, 0, 8ul, 0x200000c0ul);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20001700 = 4;
> > syscall(__NR_sched_setscheduler, 0, 1ul, 0x20001700ul);
> > res = syscall(__NR_socketpair, 1ul, 0ul, 0, 0x20000200ul);
> > if (res != -1) {
> > r[0] = *(uint32_t*)0x20000200;
> > r[1] = *(uint32_t*)0x20000204;
> > }
> > *(uint16_t*)0x2057eff8 = 0;
> > *(uint8_t*)0x2057effa = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2057effc = 0;
> > syscall(__NR_connect, r[0], 0x2057eff8ul, 0x6eul);
> > syscall(__NR_sendmmsg, r[1], 0x200bd000ul, 0x318ul, 0ul);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000040 = 0x38;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000044 = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000048 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000050 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000054 = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000058 = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000060 = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000068 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000070 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000074 = 0;
> > syscall(__NR_sched_setattr, 0, 0x20000040ul, 0ul);
> > syscall(__NR_getrlimit, 3ul, 0x200001c0ul);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000300 = 0x11;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000304 = 5;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000308 = 0x200000c0;
> > memcpy((void*)0x200000c0, "\x18\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\x00\x00\x00\x85\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x85\x00\x00\x00\x50\x00\x00\x00\x95",
> > 33);
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000310 = 0x20000100;
> > memcpy((void*)0x20000100, "syzkaller\000", 10);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000318 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000031c = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000320 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000328 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000032c = 0;
> > memset((void*)0x20000330, 0, 16);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000340 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000344 = 2;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000348 = -1;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000034c = 8;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000350 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000358 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000035c = 0x10;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000360 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000368 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000036c = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000370 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000374 = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000378 = 0;
> > res = syscall(__NR_bpf, 5ul, 0x20000300ul, 0x80ul);
> > if (res != -1)
> > r[2] = res;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20000200 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000208 = r[2];
> > syscall(__NR_bpf, 0x11ul, 0x20000200ul, 0x10ul);
> > res = syscall(__NR_socket, 0xaul, 0x80003ul, 7);
> > if (res != -1)
> > r[3] = res;
> > *(uint16_t*)0x20000040 = 0xa;
> > *(uint16_t*)0x20000042 = htobe16(0);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000044 = htobe32(0);
> > *(uint8_t*)0x20000048 = -1;
> > *(uint8_t*)0x20000049 = 1;
> > memset((void*)0x2000004a, 0, 13);
> > *(uint8_t*)0x20000057 = 1;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000058 = 4;
> > syscall(__NR_connect, r[3], 0x20000040ul, 0x1cul);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x200054c0 = 0xa;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x200054c4 = 0x16;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x200054c8 = 0x20001340;
> > memcpy((void*)0x20001340, 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> > 1628);
> > *(uint64_t*)0x200054d0 = 0x20000100;
> > memcpy((void*)0x20000100, "GPL\000", 4);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x200054d8 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x200054dc = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x200054e0 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x200054e8 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x200054ec = 0;
> > memset((void*)0x200054f0, 0, 16);
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20005500 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20005504 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20005508 = -1;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000550c = 8;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20005510 = 0x20000000;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000000 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000004 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20005518 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000551c = 0x10;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20005520 = 0x20000000;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000000 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000004 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20000008 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000000c = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20005528 = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x2000552c = 0;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20005530 = -1;
> > *(uint32_t*)0x20005534 = 0;
> > *(uint64_t*)0x20005538 = 0;
> > syscall(__NR_bpf, 5ul, 0x200054c0ul, 0x48ul);
> > return 0;
> > }
> > ```
>
> > IMHO, the root cause of this seems to be commit
> > ceb35b666d42c2e91b1f94aeca95bb5eb0943268.
>
> > Also, a user with permission to load a BPF program can use this OOB to
> > execute the desired code with kernel privileges.
>
> Let's CC Kees if you suspect the commit above. Maybe we can run
> with/without it to confirm?
I built and tested each commit of 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c' that caused
OOB, but I couldn't find the commit that caused OOB.
So, starting from upstream, I reversed commits one by one and
found the commit that triggers KASAN.
As a result of testing, OOB is triggered from commit
8fa590bf344816c925810331eea8387627bbeb40.
However, this commit seems to be a kvm related patch,
not directly related to the bpf subsystem.
IMHO, the cause of this seems to be one of these:
1. I ran this KASAN test on a nested guest in L2. That is,
there is a problem with the kvm patch 8fa590bf34481.
2. Previously, the BPF subsystem had a patch that triggers KASAN,
and KASAN is induced when kvm is patched.
3. There was confusion in the .config I tested, so the wrong
patch was derived as a test result.
I haven't been able to pinpoint what the root cause is yet.
So I didn't add a CC for 8fa590bf34481 commit.
Regards,
Hyunwoo Kim
>
> > Regards,
> > Hyunwoo Kim
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-20 11:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-19 13:59 [report] OOB in bpf_load_prog() flow Hyunwoo Kim
2022-12-19 19:02 ` sdf
2022-12-20 11:37 ` Hyunwoo Kim [this message]
2022-12-20 17:32 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2022-12-20 19:08 ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 21:03 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2022-12-23 9:45 ` Hyunwoo Kim
2022-12-23 18:31 ` Kees Cook
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