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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
	lkp@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org,
	jannh@google.com, hughd@google.com, dverkamp@chromium.org,
	dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com, dh.herrmann@gmail.com,
	jeffxu@google.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [merged mm-stable] mm-memfd-add-write-seals-when-apply-seal_exec-to-executable-memfd.patch removed from -mm tree
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 17:13:38 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230119011338.E1965C433F0@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)


The quilt patch titled
     Subject: mm/memfd: add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     mm-memfd-add-write-seals-when-apply-seal_exec-to-executable-memfd.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

------------------------------------------------------
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Subject: mm/memfd: add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2022 00:12:04 +0000

In order to avoid WX mappings, add F_SEAL_WRITE when apply F_SEAL_EXEC to
an executable memfd, so W^X from start.

This implys application need to fill the content of the memfd first, after
F_SEAL_EXEC is applied, application can no longer modify the content of
the memfd.

Typically, application seals the memfd right after writing to it.
For example:
1. memfd_create(MFD_EXEC).
2. write() code to the memfd.
3. fcntl(F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_EXEC) to convert the memfd to W^X.
4. call exec() on the memfd.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-5-jeffxu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 mm/memfd.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/mm/memfd.c~mm-memfd-add-write-seals-when-apply-seal_exec-to-executable-memfd
+++ a/mm/memfd.c
@@ -222,6 +222,12 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * SEAL_EXEC implys SEAL_WRITE, making W^X from the start.
+	 */
+	if (seals & F_SEAL_EXEC && inode->i_mode & 0111)
+		seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK|F_SEAL_GROW|F_SEAL_WRITE|F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE;
+
 	*file_seals |= seals;
 	error = 0;
 
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from jeffxu@google.com are



                 reply	other threads:[~2023-01-19  1:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

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