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From: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>
To: luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	jgross@suse.com, tiala@microsoft.com, kirill@shutemov.name,
	jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	ashish.kalra@amd.com, srutherford@google.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, anshuman.khandual@arm.com,
	pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
	daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
	alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, sandipan.das@amd.com,
	ray.huang@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, venu.busireddy@oracle.com,
	sterritt@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	samitolvanen@google.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH V3 14/16] x86/sev: Initialize #HV doorbell and handle interrupt requests
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2023 21:46:04 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230122024607.788454-15-ltykernel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230122024607.788454-1-ltykernel@gmail.com>

From: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>

Enable #HV exception to handle interrupt requests from hypervisor.

Co-developed-by: Lendacky Thomas <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Kalra Ashish <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |   6 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h         |  12 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h    |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c              | 307 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            |   2 +
 6 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 72ca90552b6a..7264ca5f5b2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
 void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
 
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
+void __init sev_snp_init_hv_handling(void);
 
 #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
 
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
 static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
+static inline void sev_snp_init_hv_handling(void) { }
 
 static inline int __init
 early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 6a6e70e792a4..70af0ce5f2c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -562,11 +562,17 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT	0
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT	1
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT	2
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_REFLECTVC_ENABLED_BIT		4
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_RESTRICTED_INJECTION_ENABLED_BIT	5
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ALTERNATE_INJECTION_ENABLED_BIT	6
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(3)
 
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_REFLECTVC_ENABLED			BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_REFLECTVC_ENABLED_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_RESTRICTED_INJECTION_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_RESTRICTED_INJECTION_ENABLED_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ALTERNATE_INJECTION_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ALTERNATE_INJECTION_ENABLED_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL	0xc001011f
 
 /* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index f8b321a11ee4..911c991fec78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -568,12 +568,12 @@ static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)
 
 	/* Check offsets of reserved fields */
 
-	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0xa0);
-	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0xcc);
-	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0xd8);
-	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0x180);
-	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0x248);
-	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0x298);
+//	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0xa0);
+//	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0xcc);
+//	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0xd8);
+//	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0x180);
+//	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0x248);
+//	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(vmcb_save_area, 0x298);
 
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0xc8);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0xcc);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index f69c168391aa..85d6882262e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT		0
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE			1
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY			2
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE		0x80000014
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_PREFERRED_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE	0
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE		1
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_QUERY_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE		2
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES			0x8000fffd
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT		0x8000ffff
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index fe5e5e41433d..03d99fad9e76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -122,6 +122,150 @@ struct sev_config {
 
 static struct sev_config sev_cfg __read_mostly;
 
+static noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state);
+static noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state);
+static int vmgexit_hv_doorbell_page(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 op, u64 pa);
+static void sev_snp_setup_hv_doorbell_page(struct ghcb *ghcb);
+
+union hv_pending_events {
+	u16 events;
+	struct {
+		u8 vector;
+		u8 nmi : 1;
+		u8 mc : 1;
+		u8 reserved1 : 5;
+		u8 no_further_signal : 1;
+	};
+};
+
+struct sev_hv_doorbell_page {
+	union hv_pending_events pending_events;
+	u8 no_eoi_required;
+	u8 reserved2[61];
+	u8 padding[4032];
+};
+
+struct sev_snp_runtime_data {
+	struct sev_hv_doorbell_page hv_doorbell_page;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_snp_runtime_data*, snp_runtime_data);
+
+static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
+{
+	return __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(u64 val)
+{
+	u32 low, high;
+
+	low  = (u32)(val);
+	high = (u32)(val >> 32);
+
+	native_wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, low, high);
+}
+
+struct sev_hv_doorbell_page *sev_snp_current_doorbell_page(void)
+{
+	return &this_cpu_read(snp_runtime_data)->hv_doorbell_page;
+}
+
+static u8 sev_hv_pending(void)
+{
+	return sev_snp_current_doorbell_page()->pending_events.events;
+}
+
+static void hv_doorbell_apic_eoi_write(u32 reg, u32 val)
+{
+	if (xchg(&sev_snp_current_doorbell_page()->no_eoi_required, 0) & 0x1)
+		return;
+
+	BUG_ON(reg != APIC_EOI);
+	apic->write(reg, val);
+}
+
+static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	union hv_pending_events pending_events;
+	u8 vector;
+
+	while (sev_hv_pending()) {
+		pending_events.events = xchg(
+			&sev_snp_current_doorbell_page()->pending_events.events,
+			0);
+
+		if (pending_events.nmi)
+			exc_nmi(regs);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+		if (pending_events.mc)
+			exc_machine_check(regs);
+#endif
+
+		if (!pending_events.vector)
+			return;
+
+		if (pending_events.vector < FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR) {
+			/* Exception vectors */
+			WARN(1, "exception shouldn't happen\n");
+		} else if (pending_events.vector == FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR) {
+			sysvec_irq_move_cleanup(regs);
+		} else if (pending_events.vector == IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR) {
+			WARN(1, "syscall shouldn't happen\n");
+		} else if (pending_events.vector >= FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR) {
+			switch (pending_events.vector) {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+			case HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_hyperv_stimer0(regs);
+				break;
+			case HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_hyperv_callback(regs);
+				break;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+			case RESCHEDULE_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_reschedule_ipi(regs);
+				break;
+			case IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_irq_move_cleanup(regs);
+				break;
+			case REBOOT_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_reboot(regs);
+				break;
+			case CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_call_function_single(regs);
+				break;
+			case CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_call_function(regs);
+				break;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
+			case ERROR_APIC_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_error_interrupt(regs);
+				break;
+			case SPURIOUS_APIC_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_spurious_apic_interrupt(regs);
+				break;
+			case LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt(regs);
+				break;
+			case X86_PLATFORM_IPI_VECTOR:
+				sysvec_x86_platform_ipi(regs);
+				break;
+#endif
+			case 0x0:
+				break;
+			default:
+				panic("Unexpected vector %d\n", vector);
+				unreachable();
+			}
+		} else {
+			common_interrupt(regs, pending_events.vector);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
@@ -179,11 +323,6 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], new_ist);
 }
 
-static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	/* Handle #HV exception. */
-}
-
 void check_hv_pending(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
@@ -232,68 +371,38 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_exit(void)
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *(unsigned long *)ist);
 }
 
-/*
- * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
- * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
- *
- * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
- */
-static noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+static bool sev_restricted_injection_enabled(void)
+{
+	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_RESTRICTED_INJECTION_ENABLED;
+}
+
+void __init sev_snp_init_hv_handling(void)
 {
+	struct sev_snp_runtime_data *snp_data;
 	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+	struct ghcb_state state;
 	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int cpu;
+	int err;
 
 	WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) || !sev_restricted_injection_enabled())
+		return;
 
 	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
-	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
 
-	if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
-		/* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
-
-		if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
-			/*
-			 * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
-			 * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
-			 * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
-			 * can be printed out.
-			 */
-			data->ghcb_active        = false;
-			data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-
-			instrumentation_begin();
-			panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
-			instrumentation_end();
-		}
-
-		/* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
-		data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
-
-		state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
+	local_irq_save(flags);
 
-		/* Backup GHCB content */
-		*state->ghcb = *ghcb;
-	} else {
-		state->ghcb = NULL;
-		data->ghcb_active = true;
-	}
+	ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
 
-	return ghcb;
-}
+	sev_snp_setup_hv_doorbell_page(ghcb);
 
-static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
-{
-	return __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
-}
-
-static __always_inline void sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(u64 val)
-{
-	u32 low, high;
+	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
 
-	low  = (u32)(val);
-	high = (u32)(val >> 32);
+	apic_set_eoi_write(hv_doorbell_apic_eoi_write);
 
-	native_wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, low, high);
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
 static int vc_fetch_insn_kernel(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -554,6 +663,69 @@ static enum es_result vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt
 /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
 #include "sev-shared.c"
 
+/*
+ * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
+ * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
+ *
+ * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
+ */
+static noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+	WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+	if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
+		/* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
+
+		if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
+			/*
+			 * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
+			 * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
+			 * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
+			 * can be printed out.
+			 */
+			data->ghcb_active        = false;
+			data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+
+			instrumentation_begin();
+			panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
+			instrumentation_end();
+		}
+
+		/* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
+		data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
+
+		state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
+
+		/* Backup GHCB content */
+		*state->ghcb = *ghcb;
+	} else {
+		state->ghcb = NULL;
+		data->ghcb_active = true;
+	}
+
+	return ghcb;
+}
+
+static void sev_snp_setup_hv_doorbell_page(struct ghcb *ghcb)
+{
+	u64 pa;
+	enum es_result ret;
+
+	pa = __pa(sev_snp_current_doorbell_page());
+	vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+	ret = vmgexit_hv_doorbell_page(ghcb,
+				       SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE,
+				       pa);
+	if (ret != ES_OK)
+		panic("SEV-SNP: failed to set up #HV doorbell page");
+}
+
 static noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
 {
 	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
@@ -1282,6 +1454,7 @@ static void snp_register_per_cpu_ghcb(void)
 	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
 
 	snp_register_ghcb_early(__pa(ghcb));
+	sev_snp_setup_hv_doorbell_page(ghcb);
 }
 
 void setup_ghcb(void)
@@ -1321,6 +1494,11 @@ void setup_ghcb(void)
 		snp_register_ghcb_early(__pa(&boot_ghcb_page));
 }
 
+int vmgexit_hv_doorbell_page(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 op, u64 pa)
+{
+	return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, NULL, SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE, op, pa);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
 static void sev_es_ap_hlt_loop(void)
 {
@@ -1394,6 +1572,7 @@ static void __init alloc_runtime_data(int cpu)
 static void __init init_ghcb(int cpu)
 {
 	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+	struct sev_snp_runtime_data *snp_data;
 	int err;
 
 	data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
@@ -1405,6 +1584,19 @@ static void __init init_ghcb(int cpu)
 
 	memset(&data->ghcb_page, 0, sizeof(data->ghcb_page));
 
+	snp_data = memblock_alloc(sizeof(*snp_data), PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (!snp_data)
+		panic("Can't allocate SEV-SNP runtime data");
+
+	err = early_set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)&snp_data->hv_doorbell_page,
+					 sizeof(snp_data->hv_doorbell_page));
+	if (err)
+		panic("Can't map #HV doorbell pages unencrypted");
+
+	memset(&snp_data->hv_doorbell_page, 0, sizeof(snp_data->hv_doorbell_page));
+
+	per_cpu(snp_runtime_data, cpu) = snp_data;
+
 	data->ghcb_active = false;
 	data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
 }
@@ -2045,7 +2237,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_USER(exc_vmm_communication)
 
 static bool hv_raw_handle_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	return false;
+	/* Clear the no_further_signal bit */
+	sev_snp_current_doorbell_page()->pending_events.events &= 0x7fff;
+
+	check_hv_pending(regs);
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 static __always_inline bool on_hv_fallback_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index d29debec8134..1aa6cab2394b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -1503,5 +1503,7 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
 	cpu_init_exception_handling();
 	/* Setup traps as cpu_init() might #GP */
 	idt_setup_traps();
+	sev_snp_init_hv_handling();
+
 	cpu_init();
 }
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-01-22  2:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-22  2:45 [RFC PATCH V3 00/16] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 01/16] x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest specific config Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 17:34   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-02  4:01     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 02/16] x86/hyperv: Decrypt hv vp assist page in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 03/16] x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in vmbus init message Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 17:55   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03  3:32     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 04/16] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 05/16] clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 06/16] x86/hyperv: decrypt vmbus pages for " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 17:58   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03  4:11     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 07/16] drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 18:02   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03  5:23     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 08/16] x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 18:20   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03  5:58     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 09/16] x86/hyperv: SEV-SNP enlightened guest don't support legacy rtc Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 14:03   ` Wei Liu
2023-02-02  3:43     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 10/16] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest Tianyu Lan
2023-01-23 15:30   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-03  7:00     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-02-06 20:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-07 13:49         ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 18:34   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03  6:10     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 11/16] x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific hadling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 12/16] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler Tianyu Lan
2023-01-23  7:33   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-03  7:27     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-02-16 13:50       ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-09 11:48   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 15:48     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-03-31 15:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-04-03 18:09     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 13/16] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path Tianyu Lan
2023-03-01 11:11   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-08 16:18     ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 15:59       ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:46 ` Tianyu Lan [this message]
2023-02-16 14:46   ` [RFC PATCH V3 14/16] x86/sev: Initialize #HV doorbell and handle interrupt requests Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-17 12:45   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-01 19:34   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-01-22  2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 15/16] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22  2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 16/16] x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths " Tianyu Lan
2023-02-02 23:20   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-08 23:53     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-21 16:44   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 16:02     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-02-02 23:00 ` [RFC PATCH V3 00/16] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Zhi Wang
2023-02-03  4:04   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-09 11:36 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-17 12:47   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-18  7:15     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-03-10 15:35     ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 16:19       ` Tianyu Lan
2023-03-15  6:40         ` Gupta, Pankaj

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