From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A127F28EB for ; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 13:58:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 26684C433D2; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 13:58:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1675087101; bh=/vEFgg09wF5YSjgFzgBQVAmj5cYnnCgev8QsubM81tE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=tiULeeLZPRELY9NwEqDytI2479OpadlR3aAHra5TvOalnOvavsistZSwwD2JkxBdZ Z6K0ijZqh1YQQJr4YhVk+IokZrK/qXP1VfYG2FREoUQLlZShPjYu5Wuw2uaeOeB5zP JQuesYFjm4CYiWGO2UmsYdKmkxESnl0gTb/4IByk= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Michal Tesar , Florian Westphal , Pablo Neira Ayuso , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1 097/313] netfilter: conntrack: handle tcp challenge acks during connection reuse Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:48:52 +0100 Message-Id: <20230130134341.153578433@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.1 In-Reply-To: <20230130134336.532886729@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20230130134336.532886729@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Florian Westphal [ Upstream commit c410cb974f2ba562920ecb8492ee66945dcf88af ] When a connection is re-used, following can happen: [ connection starts to close, fin sent in either direction ] > syn # initator quickly reuses connection < ack # peer sends a challenge ack > rst # rst, sequence number == ack_seq of previous challenge ack > syn # this syn is expected to pass Problem is that the rst will fail window validation, so it gets tagged as invalid. If ruleset drops such packets, we get repeated syn-retransmits until initator gives up or peer starts responding with syn/ack. Before the commit indicated in the "Fixes" tag below this used to work: The challenge-ack made conntrack re-init state based on the challenge ack itself, so the following rst would pass window validation. Add challenge-ack support: If we get ack for syn, record the ack_seq, and then check if the rst sequence number matches the last ack number seen in reverse direction. Fixes: c7aab4f17021 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_tcp: re-init for syn packets only") Reported-by: Michal Tesar Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index 656631083177..3ac1af6f59fc 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -1068,6 +1068,13 @@ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, ct->proto.tcp.last_flags |= IP_CT_EXP_CHALLENGE_ACK; } + + /* possible challenge ack reply to syn */ + if (old_state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT && + index == TCP_ACK_SET && + dir == IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) + ct->proto.tcp.last_ack = ntohl(th->ack_seq); + spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock); nf_ct_l4proto_log_invalid(skb, ct, state, "packet (index %d) in dir %d ignored, state %s", @@ -1193,6 +1200,14 @@ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, * segments we ignored. */ goto in_window; } + + /* Reset in response to a challenge-ack we let through earlier */ + if (old_state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT && + ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_ACK_SET && + ct->proto.tcp.last_dir == IP_CT_DIR_REPLY && + ntohl(th->seq) == ct->proto.tcp.last_ack) + goto in_window; + break; default: /* Keep compilers happy. */ -- 2.39.0