From: Bhabu Bindu <bindudaniel1996@gmail.com>
To: meta-virtualization@lists.yoctoproject.org, virendrak@kpit.com
Cc: akash.hadke@kpit.com, bruce.ashfield@gmail.com,
Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com>
Subject: [meta-virtualization][dunfell][PATCH] lxc: Fix CVE-2022-47952
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:14:49 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230220064449.337-1-bindudaniel1996@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com>
lxc-user-nic install setuid root, and may allow local users to infer
whether any file exists, even within a protected directory tree, because
“Failed to open” often indicates that a file does not exist, whereas
“does not refer to a network namespace path” often indicates that a file
exists.
Reference: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1783591
Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
---
.../lxc/files/CVE-2022-47952.patch | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_4.0.9.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 75 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 recipes-containers/lxc/files/CVE-2022-47952.patch
diff --git a/recipes-containers/lxc/files/CVE-2022-47952.patch b/recipes-containers/lxc/files/CVE-2022-47952.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eca2ad6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-containers/lxc/files/CVE-2022-47952.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 1b0469530d7a38b8f8990e114b52530d1bf7f3b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maher Azzouzi <maherazz04@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2022 13:50:25 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Patching an incoming CVE (CVE-2022-47952)
+
+lxc-user-nic in lxc through 5.0.1 is installed setuid root, and may
+allow local users to infer whether any file exists, even within a
+protected directory tree, because "Failed to open" often indicates
+that a file does not exist, whereas "does not refer to a network
+namespace path" often indicates that a file exists. NOTE: this is
+different from CVE-2018-6556 because the CVE-2018-6556 fix design was
+based on the premise that "we will report back to the user that the
+open() failed but the user has no way of knowing why it failed";
+however, in many realistic cases, there are no plausible reasons for
+failing except that the file does not exist.
+
+PoC:
+> % ls /l
+> ls: cannot open directory '/l': Permission denied
+> % /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic delete lol lol /l/h/tt h h
+> cmd/lxc_user_nic.c: 1096: main: Failed to open "/l/h/tt" <----- file does not exist.
+> % /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic delete lol lol /l/h/t h h
+> cmd/lxc_user_nic.c: 1101: main: Path "/l/h/t" does not refer to a network namespace path <---- file exist!
+
+Signed-off-by: MaherAzzouzi <maherazz04@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/1b0469530d7a38b8f8990e114b52530d1bf7f3b8]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47952
+Comment: No Hunk refreshed
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c | 15 ++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c b/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c
+index a91e2259d5..69bc6f17d1 100644
+--- a/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c
++++ b/src/lxc/cmd/lxc_user_nic.c
+@@ -1085,20 +1085,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ } else if (request == LXC_USERNIC_DELETE) {
+ char opath[LXC_PROC_PID_FD_LEN];
+
+- /* Open the path with O_PATH which will not trigger an actual
+- * open(). Don't report an errno to the caller to not leak
+- * information whether the path exists or not.
+- * When stracing setuid is stripped so this is not a concern
+- * either.
+- */
++ // Keep in mind CVE-2022-47952: It's crucial not to leak any
++ // information whether open() succeeded of failed.
++
+ netns_fd = open(args.pid, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (netns_fd < 0) {
+- usernic_error("Failed to open \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
++ usernic_error("Failed while opening netns file for \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ if (!fhas_fs_type(netns_fd, NSFS_MAGIC)) {
+- usernic_error("Path \"%s\" does not refer to a network namespace path\n", args.pid);
++ usernic_error("Failed while opening netns file for \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
+ close(netns_fd);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+@@ -1112,7 +1109,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ /* Now get an fd that we can use in setns() calls. */
+ ret = open(opath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+- CMD_SYSERROR("Failed to open \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
++ CMD_SYSERROR("Failed while opening netns file for \"%s\"\n", args.pid);
+ close(netns_fd);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
diff --git a/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_4.0.9.bb b/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_4.0.9.bb
index f7cab78..7240589 100644
--- a/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_4.0.9.bb
+++ b/recipes-containers/lxc/lxc_4.0.9.bb
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://linuxcontainers.org/downloads/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://skip_rootfs_pinning_for_read_only_filesystem.patch \
file://add_lxc_init_groups_config_key.patch \
file://lxc-conf-improve-read-only-sys-with-read-write-sys-devic.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-47952.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "365fcca985038910e19a1e0fff15ed07"
--
2.17.1
next reply other threads:[~2023-02-20 6:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-20 6:44 Bhabu Bindu [this message]
[not found] <20230220063904.32127-1-bindudaniel1996@gmail.com>
2023-02-21 15:19 ` [meta-virtualization][dunfell][PATCH] lxc: Fix CVE-2022-47952 Bruce Ashfield
2023-04-20 9:54 ` [dunfell][PATCH] " Ranjitsinh Rathod
2023-04-21 13:03 ` [meta-virtualization] " Bruce Ashfield
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