From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: george.kennedy@oracle.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
linux@weissschuh.net, stable@kernel.org,
syzkaller@googlegroups.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree
Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 18:41:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2023052216-spinner-able-566f@gregkh> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 8fb9ea65c9d1338b0d2bb0a9122dc942cdd32357
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2023052216-spinner-able-566f@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
8fb9ea65c9d1 ("vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF")
71d4abfab322 ("vc_screen: rewrite vcs_size to accept vc, not inode")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 8fb9ea65c9d1338b0d2bb0a9122dc942cdd32357 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 06:08:48 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in
vcs_write() to avoid UAF
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
After a call to console_unlock() in vcs_write() the vc_data struct can be
freed by vc_port_destruct(). Because of that, the struct vc_data pointer
must be reloaded in the while loop in vcs_write() after console_lock() to
avoid a UAF when vcs_size() is called.
Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs_size().
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880beab89a8 by task repro_vcs_size/4119
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380)
vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215)
vcs_write (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:664)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:582 fs/read_write.c:564)
...
<TASK>
Allocated by task 1213:
kmalloc_trace (mm/slab_common.c:1064)
vc_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:559 ./include/linux/slab.h:680
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1078 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1058)
con_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3334)
tty_init_dev (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1303 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1415
drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1392)
tty_open (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2082 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2128)
chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:415)
do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:921)
vfs_open (fs/open.c:1052)
...
Freed by task 4116:
kfree (mm/slab_common.c:1016)
vc_port_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1044)
tty_port_destructor (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:296)
tty_port_put (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:312)
vt_disallocate_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2))
vt_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:903)
tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2778)
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880beab8800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of
freed 1024-byte region [ffff8880beab8800, ffff8880beab8c00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000afc77580 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0x0 pfn:0xbeab8
head:00000000afc77580 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0
pincount:0
flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 ffffea000426de00 dead000000000002
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880beab8880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880beab8900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880beab8980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880beab8a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880beab8a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Fixes: ac751efa6a0d ("console: rename acquire/release_console_sem() to console_lock/unlock()")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1683889728-10411-1-git-send-email-george.kennedy@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c
index 498ba9c0ee93..829c4be66f3b 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c
@@ -656,10 +656,17 @@ vcs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
}
}
- /* The vcs_size might have changed while we slept to grab
- * the user buffer, so recheck.
+ /* The vc might have been freed or vcs_size might have changed
+ * while we slept to grab the user buffer, so recheck.
* Return data written up to now on failure.
*/
+ vc = vcs_vc(inode, &viewed);
+ if (!vc) {
+ if (written)
+ break;
+ ret = -ENXIO;
+ goto unlock_out;
+ }
size = vcs_size(vc, attr, false);
if (size < 0) {
if (written)
reply other threads:[~2023-05-22 17:41 UTC|newest]
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