From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
<vishal.l.verma@intel.com>, <fan.ni@samsung.com>,
<a.manzanares@samsung.com>, <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/6] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase
Date: Wed, 31 May 2023 17:41:27 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230531174127.000004a3@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230526033344.17167-6-dave@stgolabs.net>
On Thu, 25 May 2023 20:33:43 -0700
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> wrote:
> Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive secure erase, per
> CXL specs. Create a write-only 'security/erase' sysfs file to
> perform the requested operation.
>
> As with the sanitation this requires the device being offline
> and thus no active HPA-DPA decoding.
>
> The expectation is that userspace can use it such as:
>
> cxl disable-memdev memX
> echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
> cxl enable-memdev memX
>
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Trivial comment inline.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 10 +++++++++
> drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 6 +++++-
> drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index 5753cba98692..f224c1215f22 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -85,6 +85,16 @@ Description:
> the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.
>
>
> +What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
> +Date: June, 2023
> +KernelVersion: v6.5
> +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> + (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
> + secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for
> + all user data areas of the device.
> +
> +
> What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
> Date: June, 2021
> KernelVersion: v5.14
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index 51c64829f20a..6622eac66bf1 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd)
> };
> struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { .opcode = cmd };
>
> - if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE)
> + if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE && cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE)
Maybe just use a switch + default for the inevitable growth of this list and
attempting to avoid churn?
> return -EINVAL;
>
> rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd);
> @@ -1120,6 +1120,10 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd)
> if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + if (cmd == CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE &&
> + sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
> if (rc < 0) {
> dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc);
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> index 90f23e53d483..d06c8539e82c 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> @@ -163,6 +163,33 @@ static ssize_t security_sanitize_store(struct device *dev,
> static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize =
> __ATTR(sanitize, 0200, NULL, security_sanitize_store);
>
> +static ssize_t security_erase_store(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr,
> + const char *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + struct cxl_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev);
> + ssize_t rc;
> + bool erase;
> +
> + if (kstrtobool(buf, &erase) || !erase)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* ensure no regions are mapped to this memdev */
> + if (port->commit_end != -1)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE);
> +
> + return rc ? rc : len;
> +}
> +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_erase =
> + __ATTR(erase, 0200, NULL, security_erase_store);
> +
> static int cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd)
> {
> struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> @@ -411,6 +438,7 @@ static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_ram_attributes[] = {
> static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = {
> &dev_attr_security_state.attr,
> &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr,
> + &dev_attr_security_erase.attr,
> NULL,
> };
>
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 408ec33c8480..758fea7b9dbf 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -392,6 +392,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
> CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE = 0x4400,
> + CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4401,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-31 16:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-26 3:33 [PATCH v5 0/6] cxl: Support device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-26 3:33 ` [PATCH 1/6] cxl/mem: Introduce security state sysfs file Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-30 23:30 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-31 16:10 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-31 17:48 ` Fan Ni
2023-05-26 3:33 ` [PATCH 2/6] cxl/mbox: Add sanitation handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-30 23:36 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-31 16:29 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-31 16:36 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-26 3:33 ` [PATCH 3/6] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-26 3:41 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-30 23:53 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-31 16:39 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-26 3:33 ` [PATCH 4/6] cxl/test: Add Sanitize opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-26 3:33 ` [PATCH 5/6] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-30 23:54 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-31 16:41 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2023-06-01 17:24 ` Fan Ni
2023-05-26 3:33 ` [PATCH 6/6] cxl/test: Add Secure Erase opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
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