From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org, jannh@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 14:53:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202306201452.95107E750@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230616000441.3677441-4-kpsingh@kernel.org>
On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 02:04:39AM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
> LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
> which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
> attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
> is especially bad in kernel hot paths:
Overall, I find this a much cleaner patch compared to the v1 -- thanks
for cleaning up how the loops are replaced. I'm looking forward to v3
(with the build fixes and other comments addressed), as I think the
performance benefit this series provides is significant.
Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-20 21:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-16 0:04 [PATCH v2 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-06-16 0:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-06-16 0:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-06-16 0:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-06-16 22:27 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-09-16 0:54 ` KP Singh
2023-06-16 0:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-06-16 1:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-06-17 15:09 ` KP Singh
2023-06-16 3:41 ` kernel test robot
2023-06-16 21:09 ` kernel test robot
2023-06-17 15:39 ` KP Singh
2023-06-20 21:53 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-06-16 0:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-06-16 0:04 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-06-16 1:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-06-17 15:11 ` KP Singh
2023-06-20 20:58 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-18 13:27 ` KP Singh
2023-09-18 13:55 ` Paul Moore
2023-09-18 16:28 ` KP Singh
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