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From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Cc: steffen.klassert@secunet.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
	pabeni@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2023 14:55:00 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230726115500.GV11388@unreal> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230723074110.3705047-1-linma@zju.edu.cn>

On Sun, Jul 23, 2023 at 03:41:10PM +0800, Lin Ma wrote:
> The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change
> message to user space") added one additional attribute named
> XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy
> (net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c).
> 
> However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at
> xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4
> bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which
> leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing
> nlattrs.
> 
> To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then
> leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into
> x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to
> userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...).
> 
> The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. 

This CVE is a joke, you need to be root to execute this attack.

Anyway change is ok.
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-07-26 11:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-23  7:41 [PATCH v1] xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH Lin Ma
2023-07-25 11:35 ` Simon Horman
2023-07-26 11:55 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2023-07-26 13:32   ` Lin Ma
2023-07-30 10:52     ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-08-01 10:00 ` Steffen Klassert

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